We saw in Part One how, under OP AMBUSCADE, HMCS Ojibwa conducted a ‘fishpat’ on Georges Bank in March 1993, in large part to raise the profile of Canada’s submarines.
Gaining publicity was also an ingredient of a similar operation carried out the following year on the Grand Banks, but the fisheries situation was far more serious. Newfoundland’s once bountiful cod fishery had collapsed, and in 1992 the Canadian government had declared a mora- torium on that type of fishing. Canada laid the blame for over-fishing on members of the European Union (EU), particularly Portugal and Spain. They conceded stocks were in crisis and adhered to the moratorium, but they turned to fishing Turbot with the result that stock was soon under pressure. As the crisis escalated, in September HMCS Okanagan was tasked for OP GROUSE, a fisheries patrol off the 200-mile limit of the Grand Banks. Okanagan was commanded by LCDR Larry Hickey, a colorful, aggressive submariner who had previously carried out a de- manding patrol against Soviet SSBNs in the Labrador Sea.
GROUSE proved a more formidable challenge than AMBUSCADE. Instead of patrolling the relatively short 60-mile section of the Hague Line across Georges Bank, Okanagan’s area of operations covered the Nose and Tail of the Bank, Flemish Cap and adjacent waters; an area of some 65,000 square miles. It encompassed both deep and shallow water, each with its own distinct surveillance challenges. There were also more vessels fishing on the Grand Banks, and they were from several nations. Due to these challenges, additional naval and DFO assets supported Okanagan, but co-ordination proved seriously flawed—for example, although the destroyer HMCS Fraser was also deployed to the Banks, there was no formal coordination with the submarine. Critically, unlike
AMBUSCADE where the embarked Fisheries Officer only provid- ed technical advice, in GROUSE he would actually direct Okanagan’s movements. This highlighted a fundamental philosophical difference be- tween the navy and DFO. Hickey outlined that “Okanagan’s objective, as far as the Navy was concerned, was to effect the arrest of a violator”:
Of secondary importance was the gathering of intelligence on fish-ing vessels, and compiling a picture of their patterns of operating. Since
enforcement is routine for DFO, they have a long-range perspective on the way they conduct business, ie. ‘if we don’t catch them this time, we’ll catch them later.’ On the other hand, naval units have a short-term desire for significant incident, eg. an arrest of a violator. The Navy’s perspective tends to view the patrol as a two-week window during which something has to be achieved, something concrete that can be pointed to and the statement made, ‘Look what we did.’
Confronting these challenges at sea, Hickey could only rely upon
“flexibility and compromise” to make the most of the situation.
Okanagan departed Halifax on 26 September for her two day pas- sage to the southeast extremity of the Grand Banks. Frustration soon arose. The DFO officer decided to initially head to the Tail of the Bank to verify if foreign fishing vessels were using Canadian swordfishermen as cover to fish illegally. He then wanted to head eastward into deep wa- ter to track vessels heading northwards from the 800 meter line towards the 200-mile boundary. When Hickey requested the schedule of DFO air patrols to ascertain the surface picture, he learned flight plans were not finalized until just before take-off to ensure optimal weather. Thus, the schedule was subject to change at short notice, which obviously af- fected the flow of intelligence. Moreover, Hickey was flabbergasted to discover he could not communicate with the aircraft since the “[frequen- cies] embarked DFO has on the back Fag [cigarette] packet don’t appear to work.” Given the distances involved, aerial support was critical to GROUSE, but it was to be available only sporadically.
On the evening of 28 September Okanagan discovered coordination with surface forces was equally poor. When Hickey took a routine all round look with the periscope while shadowing a Portuguese fishing ves-sel from close range, he was startled to see the destroyer Fraser passing down the other side of the target. Hickey had no warning of her presence and raised the communications mast “to let her know we’re here, and try to determine her intentions.” Fraser informed Okanagan that she and the DFO vessel L.J. Cowley had been patrolling the area for two days and had boarded six vessels. That obviously bred caution amongst fishermen so the DFO officer decided to move elsewhere. Thus, poor mission plan- ning eroded valuable submarine patrol time.
Okanagan headed towards deep water on the eastern side of the Tail of the Bank to intercept Spanish trawlers reportedly heading to that area from Flemish Cap. Before the patrol Hickey had expressed his in- tention to take more risks when shadowing fishing vessels than he nor- mally would against warships, and his handling of one Spanish contact demonstrated his comfort in doing so. After sighting a trawler by peri- scope at about 8,500 yards and tracking it by sonar and radar, Hickey approached the target from ahead, starboard side to. He took Okanagan in close, all the while maintaining awareness of her fishing gear. With tongue in cheek, he signalled MARLANT that he made an “effing close pass. Not fessing up to actual CPA since squad[ron] boss may read. Will have fudged records by [return to] Halifax.” In fact, the patrol records remained “unfudged”, and show that Okanagan passed within 200 yards of the trawler. Sneaking quick peaks through the periscope Hickey was close enough to see the boat make sternway as it reeled in its net, and since he could clearly observe the crew concentrating on their work he knew there was little risk of counter-detection. Having collected imag- ery, Okanagan withdrew to about 2000 yards but the DFO officer asked to move in again to see if he could ascertain the species of fish being caught but the Spaniards recovered their nets before the boat could get close enough. As it was, the vessels were fishing legally.
For the next three days Okanagan remained in deep water on the eastern side of the Tail, patrolling along the 800-metre contour. She shadowed four Spanish trawlers, and an EU fisheries patrol vessel was observed trailing the same vessels. Her presence, reinforced by ‘Fish- ery Patrol’ emblazoned in huge letters on her hull, accounts for the fact that the trawlers fished legally. Exasperated yet again, Hickey and the DFO officer shifted their patrol area, this time to Flemish Cap, report-edly “alive” with fishing activity. Incredibly, since the DFO office in St John’s had closed for the weekend, approval for the move could not be requested until Monday 3 October, four days hence.
Frustration also arose with the aerial surveillance. Hickey learned that a DFO flight on Saturday 1 October had “located two Spaniards fish- ing [illegally] up on the Bank but that information had not been shared with MARLANT, preventing the submarine from being cued to the lo- cation. Hickey noted that his fisheries officer is “getting as annoyed at DFO as I am.” MARLANT also expressed irritation. On Tuesday they informed Okanagan, “Still awaiting DFO flight info for this week. Ex- pecting it yesterday.” At 1615Z on Tuesday 4 October MARLANT fi- nally transmitted DFO’s approval for Okanagan to head to Flemish Cap. But, Hickey complained, this came “regrettably too late to make the dash. Would only have about 8 hrs daylight onsta[tion].” Instead, he requested intelligence of fishing activity on The Nose of the Bank and shifted to that area.
In the midst of this inertia, Okanagan had patrolled shallow water on the Tail of the Bank. Hickey later reported “the beauty of working shallow water is that no one is supposed to be here. Hence any vessel found here is suspect.” That description certainly applied to an Ameri- can fishing vessel Okanagan encountered that evening. It was transiting across shallow water and Hickey explained in his patrol narrative, “DFO has a feeling he will start fishing soon. Intend to fall in astern and watch for this to happen. If he fishes for flounder, will call in [DFO vessel] COWLEY, although not breaking law per se, it is still a violation of moratorium. If he fishes scallops, we’ll arrest him.” The next few hours confirmed the unique capability of a submarine for the task. Night had fallen and it would have been difficult for an aircraft or surface vessel to conduct surveillance, but Okanagan monitored her acoustically and visually as she proceeded northeast at about nine knots with no evidence of fishing activity. After about two hours lines were finally sighted ex- tending astern from the fishing boat. Okanagan immediately passed the information to the L.J. Cowley who boarded the vessel at first light.
With the end of GROUSE in sight, as on AMBUSCADE, debate cen- tred on obtaining a photograph of Okanagan surfaced alongside a fish- ing boat to punctuate the deterrence aspect of the mission. MARLANT sought to complete the mission covertly, but DFO wanted to publicise the submarine’s presence, and as the lead agency that view prevailed. Politics also likely played a role. MARLANT instructed Okanagan the order of priority for the subject vessel was: first, European; second, any other nationality; and, third, Canadian; “US vessels are only to be used as a last resort.” Okanagan soon found a candidate trawling on the eastern edge of the Tail of the Bank. Approaching to within 450 yards, Okanagan identified her as the Pescamaro Uno. When the DFO aircraft arrived, Okanagan surfaced 900 yards on its starboard beam. As Hickey signalled MARLANT, the Spanish were stunned when a submarine sur- faced close alongside:
Sealand VHF 16 verified that OOW of Pescamaro Uno has com- mendable fluency of expletives in both English and Spanish. Synopsis of TX [text] goes like this quote Submarine Submarine four letter expletive referring to carnal knowledge times 3 followed by incoherent babbling in Spanish unquote.
GROUSE ended on that colourful note. Hickey informed MAR- LANT that Okanagan had “binted, fingerprinted and verified ID of six- teen vessels/ 10 Spanish/ 2 US/ 2 Cdn/ 1 Portuguese/ 1 Isle of Man. Detected one violator who was turned over to DFO surface patrol craft.” Okanagan captured a wealth of intelligence and tactical information. For example, Hickey found he could snort within 6000-10,000 yards of a target without detection; that trawlers steered steady courses and speeds whereas scallop draggers moved unpredictably; and that vessels moved slow enough to be shadowed submerged. He also found that when try- ing to approach to within a CPA of 500 yards, closing from the quarter proved the safest, most controlled approach with little risk of counter-de- tection or getting entangled in netting. Okanagan also collected intel- ligence about fishing procedures, the particulars of individual vessels, crew positions, as well as acoustic and ELINT profiles, all of which were added to a data base. Overall, he thought GROUSE had been an ex- cellent training vehicle since it was “a military surveillance operation whose targets of interest just happened to be fishing vessels.”
Detailed post action analyses indicated a number of areas for im- provements. Not surprisingly, Hickey had strong opinions about the command and control problems, explaining that the patrol “was a fluid response to current intelligence” that “proved to be stale and time late.” The fisheries officer “was given free rein by DFO as he saw fit, and this took the form of requests to cover large distances at best speed.” As a result, the submarine “spent a considerable number of hours snorting at 8 to 10 knots to reposition”; not the optimal surveillance posture. Observ- ing that surface assets and Okanagan worked at cross-purposes, Hickey recommended that surface vessels should “bait the trap” by operating in deep water, while the submarine positioned herself at least twenty miles away in shallow water, so as to catch vessels trying to take advantage of the absence of the patrol ship. Finally, due to DFO’s adherence to a five- day, 0800-1600 routine, “if a violation is detected outside normal work- ing hours, apprehension would have to be delayed until DFO went back to work.” Addressing these and other issues, MARLANT dispatched personnel to St John’s to work out solutions with their DFO counterparts.
Despite the obvious drawbacks, GROUSE achieved one spectacular result. In the wake of the so-called ‘Turbot War’ between Canada and Spain in the first months of 1995, a photograph of a Spanish fishing vessel taken through the lens of a submarine attack periscope dominated the entire front page of the Toronto Sun, a popular Canadian newspaper. The accompanying headline blared, “Canada to Spain: We’re Watching You…And This Is How We Do It!” The message seemed apparent: a Canadian submarine had been at sea monitoring Spanish fishermen. In fact, no Canadian submarine deployed to the Grand Banks during the ‘Turbot War’ and the photo had actually been taken by Okanagan during GROUSE. Yet, AMBUSCADE and GROUSE had demonstrated that Canada did deploy submarines on fisheries patrols, and during the Tur- bot dispute, MARLANT used a variety of mechanisms to convince oth- ers they had sent a boat into the area. Whether or not the ruse worked remains unknown; however, the photograph convinced the Canadian public that one of their submarines had been at sea defending their fish- eries. That probably garnered the submarine service more positive pub-
licity than it had ever received before.
AMBUSCADE and GROUSE demonstrated that submarines could
bring unique capabilities to fisheries patrols. Significantly, at a time when the focus of the Canadian people was firmly fixed on fisheries issues, submarines played a perceptible role in tackling the problem, providing a positive outcome to the navy’s desire to raise their profile. Moreover, unlike patrols against Soviet submarines or other military assets, fishpats were contributions average Canadians could understand and appreciate more readily. The experience was thus ‘win-win’ on a number of levels.
As it was, the ‘O-boats’ did not carry out any more dedicated fish- pats—the only other such mission was a ‘drive-by’ fisheries surveillance Okanagan performed on her way home from the UK in November 1996. The Oberons’ service was winding down and the navy was making way for the new Windsor class boats acquired from the Royal Navy. Unhap- pily, the transition to the new boats proved immensely challenging, to say the least, and the positive public glow around submarines dissipat- ed. Only in the last few years have Canadian submariners been able to perform operations on a sustained basis, so the navy once again faces the challenge of creating positive profile for a platform that proved so
valuable in the mid-1990s.
Michael Whitby is Senior Naval Historian with Canada’s Department of Na- tional Defence. This study is largely based upon documents that remain clas- sified as well as interviews with submariners. It is excerpted from “Boomers, Draggers and Black Boxes: The Operational Legacy of Canada’s Oberon class Submarines, 1985-1998”, The Northern Mariner Vol. XXIII (2013), which cov- ers the full operational history of the Oberons during that period and includes full citations; any reader wanting a copy of that study can contact the author at michael.whitby@forces.gc.ca.
