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A 1975 article entitled “Forecasting in Military Affairs”, by Y. V. Chuyev and Y.B. Mikhaylov, helps to explain why the Soviets make their submarines the dominant offensive force of the Soviet Fleet.The systems analysis course is being revised to take advantage of the students’ fleet experience.

In 1985 it is anticipated that analog fire control system training will be deleted from the Advanced Course and taught on a stand-alone basis to officers assigned to submarines so equipped. In its place, training on the Combat Control System (MK 117 FCS modified for TOMAHAWK use) will be added.

Nine Advanced Course classes convene each year. This is up from four less than two years ago. Class size is 20-30. The 1984  course  breakdown    is    as   follows:Sixty officers are involved in teaching the Basic and Advanced Courses.

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A 1975 article entitled “Forecasting in Military Affairs”, by Y.V. Chuyev and Y.B. Mikhaylov, helps to explain why the Soviets make their submarines the dominant offensive force of the Soviet  Fleet.  The systems analysis investigation used by the two Soviet authors arrives at a simple answer — submarines use torpedoes and torpedoes do the most damage to surface ships.

The purpose of the referenced analysis was to determine the effectiveness of damage inflicted on British cruisers during World War II, as a result of enemy naval gunfire, aircraft bombing attacks, torpedo attacks, and mine explosions. From the results, recommendations were derived for the most effective system of cruiser defense. ” In the investigation, the effectiveness for the damage was defined as the number of months needed to repair and bring a cruiser back into service. The maximum loss was estimated at 3b cruiser-months, i.e., the time required for the construction of a new cruiser in place of one that had been sunk. The statistical data are given in the following table”:

“An examination of the data given in the table shows that more than half of the cruiser casualties (out of the total number of cases of cruisers sunk or damaged) were caused by aircraft bombing attacks. Therefore t at first sight it seems that the main problem was to improve the ships’ air defense systems. However a more detailed analysis shows that the number of cruiser-months lost when a cruiser was put out of action was highest as a result of torpedo attacks, since the damage sustained in this case was three times more serious than, for examplet as a result of bombing. Moreover, a study of the damage resulting from bombing attacks shows that the majority of cruisers sunk in this fashion sustained damage below the waterline as a result of the explosion of bombs dropped in the immediate vicinity of the ship.”

“Thus, more than half of the lost cruiser-months was due to underwater damage of the ships’ hulls. Therefore, it could be concluded that the underwater part of new cruisers should have better protection.”

*This analysis was taken from Methods of Operations Research, by Philip M. Morse and George E. Kimball, published in the u.s. at New York, MIT Press,  1951.

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