THE SEA WOLF (SSN-21)

Enclosed is a copy of the white paper we have developed for the SSN-21. I am sending a copy to each of your chapter presidents for them to use as they see fit, including showing or giving to their various members so that we can get as many people as possible to understand that the SSN-21 submarine is the submarine we need and that we need it now.

Although the threat in Europe may, in fact, be decreasing, the capability of the Soviet submarine force is not. The Soviet submarine force, as we physically observe it, is building about nine submarines a year; that is, in 1990 and expected in 1991. Of those submarines, four are KILO class diesel submarines and the other five are one or two SSBNs and three or four nuclear attack submarines. A second data point that I would make was that when Marshall Akharomeyev was in town testifying before Senator Kennedy’s committee in early May, he stated that he expected the Soviet Union to build at a rate of four to five nuclear submarines per year. Everyone should understand that the United States authorized three SSNs in 1989 (one SSN-21 and two 6881s), one SSN-6881 in 1990 and we are asking for two SSN-21s in 1991.

Again, it is my most strong professional opinion that we must have the SSN-21, and we must have it now. Hope that this paper which we have also distributed on the Hill, will help everyone to realize the importance of this program.

Vice Admiral D. L. Cooper, USN
ACNO (Undersea Warfare

REQUIREMENT FOR THE FY91 SEA WOLF (SSN-21) SUBMARINES

The execution of our national military strategy, the projected threat, and the advance of submarine technology continue to substantiate the absolute need for the FY91 SSN-21s. It is essential that we build the SEA WOLF because:

• Despite a changing world, our far-folWBrd national military strategy has not changed
  -Based on our dependence as an island nation
  -Requires early response to broad range of possible conflicts with sustainable, survivable, far-forward presence
• Attack submarines are required to execute this strategyproviding slgntncant Oexibility and power projection capability
  -In a regional crisis, SSNs can covertly gather intelligence and provide strike, mining, and special forces insertion capability
  -If conflict escalation control fails, SSNs can seize the initiative and quickly neutralize enemy forces.
• Threat capability will continue to improve by all intelligence estimates
  -Soviet submarines in production today are far superior to early classes
  -Rate of Soviet submarine production and research has not decreased
  -Over 40 countries, some unfriendly to the U.S., have submarines with capable weaponry that are potential ASW threats to our battle force
• There is no reasonable alternative to the SSN-ll
  -1688 cannot physically accommodate the improvements required to counter the significantly improved projected threat
  -A more capable and cost-effective submarine cannot be built
  -SSN-21 can be procured within Navy resources
• The SSN-21 program is eight years into execution, is on schedule, and has met all requirements.
  -Lead ship has been under construction since October ’89
  -Over $5B invested in SSN-21 R&D, design, and construction
  -SSN-21 pre-operational testing is unparalleled in submarine program history
  -BSY-2 software development on schedule
  – BSY-2 combat system will be fully capable at lead ship delivery
  -Recent independent analyses have concluded that SSN 21 will be superior to the projected threat
  -SECDEF Risk/Concurrency report concluded SSN-21 & BSY-2 risk moderate
• Delaying authorization of the FY91 SSN-21s will lacrease program cost, erode the already fragile submarine industrial base, aDd Jeopardize U.S. undersea superiority
  -Delaying FY91 SSN-21s one year would result in a unit cost increase of $160M
  -Submarine vendor base is unique national strategic asset — only source capable of producing state-of-the-art nuclear and quieting components. SSN-21 production delays will cause irrevocable damage to this vital industry

SSN-21 IS THE KEY TO THIS NATION’S UNDERSEA SUPERIORITY AND POWER PROJETION CAPABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

SEAWOLF (SSN-21) WHITE PAPER

PURPOSE
To discuss the requirement for the SEA WOLF submarine in light of recent changes in the world, and, more specifically, how the execution of our national military strategy, the projected threat, and the advance of technology continue to substantiate the absolute need for the SEAWOLF (SSN-21) Class of submarines.

BACKGROUND
There is no question that the recent events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have altered the social and political makeup of the world. These changes have served to remind us of the rapid and unpredictable nature by which political circumstances and intentions can change. Although dramatic reforms have taken place in the world, the maritime component of our national military strategy, which is fundamentally based on our dependence as an island nation, has not chanKed. This strategy requires us to maintain the capability to provide an early response to a broad spectrum of possible conflicts and to be able to project naval power with a sustainable, survivable, far-forward presence. The fundamental characteristics of our attack submarine force -stealth, mobility, firepower and endurance, are essential elements of the sustainable, survivable, far-forward naval presence required by our national military strategy.

As the world shifts from a bipolar to a multipolar system our involvement in regional crises can be expected to increase. With the continued proliferation of advanced technology weapons to Third World nations, the mission of regional crisis containment will become more difficult. Attack submarines provide invaluable options in executing the mission of conflict containment in our national military strategy. In a crisis, SSNs can rapidly be deployed to any ocean of the world, gather intelligence and surveillance information covertly, and remain on station unsupported in hostile waters for long periods. While on station, covertly gathering intelligence, the SSN can also provide the Battle Force Commander with significant strike capability, mining and special forces insertion capability ·-all while remaining completely undetected. When no longer needed, the submarine can quietly be withdrawn. If conflict escalation control fails, the far-forward covert presence of the attack submarine force can “seize the initiative” and quickly neutralize enemy forces before they leave home waters or inflict harm to U.S. and allied forces. The submarine force creates leverage out of proportion to its size because an adversary never knows whether or in what number submarines might be present.

Since the need for attack submarines to execute our national military strategy has not changed, the requirement for the specific type of submarine needed to implement that strategy is driven by the projected threat capability and the missions which we will execute. Although the threat of nuclear war and the invasion of Europe may have decreased, the threat from the Soviets rapidly modernizing and increasingly capable submarine force has not. Recent intelligence reaffirms that the Soviets are firmly committed to attack submarine development and production. Some projections may indicate that the Soviet attack submarine force level will decrease. This quantitative reduction in force would be solely due to the retirement of their oldest, less capable classes of submarines. Simultaneously, the Soviet’s are continuing to produce markedly improved submarines at an unwavering pace assisted by the acquisition of western technology and a dedicated, well funded research and development program. Thus, the Soviet’s projected force reductions, coupled with their building rate, will produce a 21st century submarine force that is significantly more capable, although slightly smaller in size.

The United States Submarine Force has maintained its historic edge in undersea superiority and absorbed a growing role in power projection capability because our force has consistently been superior in quality. We have never had equal numbers. We have achieved this qualitative superiority through the systematic modernization of our force in the three vital areas of submarine performance – weapons, sensors, and platform capability. This modernization of force capability has been centered mainly around the Los Angeles (SSN-688) Class of submarines. To keep pace with threat technological advances, this class has incorporated over 25 major and 2000 minor improvements in the last two decades. This has resulted in nearly a complete redesign of the interior spaces of the original submarine and a substantial improvement in its capability. In the process of installing all of these improvements, however, we have exhausted the design weight margin of the original 688. The 1688 cannot physically accommodate the changes necessary to incorporate the next generation of technology to face the projected threat of the 21st century.

DISCUSSION:
With strong Congressional support, the SEA WOLF program was begun seven years ago to meet the projected ASW threat and to provide a balanced power projection capability option in the execution of our national military strategy in the 21st century. When SEAWOLF joins the fleet in 1995, she will take to sea:

• The ultimate in 20th century stealth technology – The SEA WOLF will be the quietest submarine in the world at any speed. In fact, SEA WOLF will be over 30 times quieter than our original 688 Class of submarines.
• Double the firepower of the most advanced operational Soviet submarine – SEA WOLFs torpedo room will carry TOMAHAWK (sea and land·attack) missiles, HARPOON missiles, MK48 ADCAP and CCAPS torpedoes, mines, and when developed, remotely operated vehicles.
• Highest tactical speed of any submarine in the world, providing greater search effectiveness and lower probability of counterdetection.
• Sufficient design margin for growth to incorporate future technology advances. We have utilized advanced technology design procedures to construct SEA WOLF to allow efficient modernization and maintenance to take place throughout the ship’s life. This well result in reduced operating and support costs throughout its lifetime.

During these first eight years of the SEA WOLF program, close Congressional and DoD oversight has resulted in numerous reports, audits, reviews, analyses, and hearings which have probed every aspect of the program. Every problem and issue raised by these inquiries has been or is being resolved by the Navy to ensure that the SEAWOLF will meet all of its Top Level requirements. (Enclosure (1) addresses SSN·21 and BSY ·2 issues.)

One of the specific issues currently being raised is the effectiveness of the SSN·21 against the projected threat. The Congressionally directed initial operating capability (IOC) plus· ten·year dynamic mission analysis, completed by DoD early this year, clearly showed that the SEAWOLF will be superior to the projected threat at IOC plus·ten·years. This mission analysis was conducted using the same modeling techniques as previously accepted studies and a threat which was approved by CIA, DIA, and the Navy intelligence community.

Another issue being raised is the status of the development of the SEA WOLFs ANIBSY·2 combat system. This program, aft~r initially experiencing difficulties in software development, is on sch ~ule and is complying with all applicable DoD directives. Learning from previous ship combat system design integration, we have established a team of top shipyard, Navy, and contractor personnel to ensure the timely integration of the .BSY·2 into the submarine. The SEAWOLF will be delivered with a fully capable BSY·2 combat system.

Over the past eight years, the Navy has invested over two billion dollars in research and development to design, develop and test shipboard prototype components. The component testing conducted to date on the SSN-21 equipment is unparalleled in previous submarine programs. The Navy’s success record of delivering submarines which meet all design requirements is clear, stretching all the way back to the NAUTILUS shipbuilding program. The SEA WOLF will meet all of its Top Level requirements when delivered in May of 1995.

The SEA WOLF program is on schedule and meeting all of its requirements. As a result, there is no valid justification to delay authorization of follow-on SEA WOLF class submarines by concluding that additional time will somehow provide us with a more capable and cost-effective submarine. In fact, delaying the award of additional SSN-21s until the lead ship completes post-delivery testing would be catastrophic to our nation’s undersea superiority and would result in greatly increased program cost. Without a continuing new construction workload, the shipyards would experience voids in key construction trade work as early as 1992. In addition, the base of submarine vendors which produces the critical components required for submarine and nuclear safety would be irrevocably damaged.

CONCLUSIONS:

• Despite a changing world, the far-forward national military strategy has not changed
• Attack submarines are required to execute this strategy -providing significant flexibility and power projection capability
• The threat is projected to continue to improve in capability by all intelligence estimates
• Current classes of submarines cannot incorporate the improvements necessary to meet the projected threat
• The SSN-21 program is eight years into execution, is on schedule, and has met all requirements
• There is no reasonable alternative to the SSN-21

Delaying authorization of follow-on ships will increase program cost, erode the already fragile submarine industrial base, and forfeit U.S. undersea superiority.

ENCLOSURE 1: SSN-21 & BSY-2 ISSUES

SSN-21 SCHEDULE AND COST

Issue: SSN-21 delivery slipped six months.
Navy Response: Do not concur. The initial SEA WOLF completion date was estimated to be November of 1994 during the early stages of the program. During contract negotiations, however, the Navy determined that this completion date was one of the factors driving higher than expected lead ship bids. As a result, the Navy allowed the shipyards to set the most economically feasible delivery date of May 1995. There was no slip in the schedule. The Navy made this decision to reduce cost and optimize shipyard performance.

Issue: Design contract cost overran $38M at Newport News and $7.5M at Electric Boat.
Navy Response: Partially concur. The SSN-21 design is not complete. Initial design costs were underfunded. Many factors have increased the scope of the design effort since the SSN21 is the first submarine to incorporate modular design. This experience, however, should have significant benefits in reducing recurring construction program costs of future ships.

Issue: Navy hos issued contract to Newport News to design a new submarine.
Navy Response: Do not concur. There is no plan or a requirement for a follow-on submarine. The contract was for development studies and for the design, fabrication, and integration of engineering development models and prototypes and design improvements in direct support of the SEA WOLF. The contract also includes funding for studies related to the transition of the Congressionally directed Defense Advanced Research Projects (DARPA) advanced submarine technology effort into Navy submarine technology development. It is standard procedure for all such changes to be evaluated to determine their feasibility for installation on current and future submarine classes. The SEA WOLF is the Navy’s only attack submarine under design. There is no design work being done on a follow-on submarine.

Issue: SSN-21 met only two of six goals established by the Navy in 1982.
Navy Response: Do not concur. No goals were established for SEA WOLF in 1982 An ad hoc committee, established by the Chief of Naval Operations in 1982, was tasked with assessing the predicted threat to a new SSN in the mid-1990s, summarizing the requirements for a new SSN in that time frame, and establishing a range of parameters for a new SSN. Six parameters were selected: speed, depth, torpedo tubes, arctic capability, broadband and narrowband radiated noise, and hull sonar sensitivity, each with a range of values. These values were never intended to be SSN-21 requirements; instead, they were viewed as a range of technologically and fiscally feasible possibilities. Using these ranges as a guide, in 1983 the Navy conducted a second in-depth study to determine what specific value of the six Group Tango parameters could be attained in an actual platform from an engineering standpoint, using present or near-term technology, and within fiscal constraints. Using this study, after careful consideration of the tradeoffs associated with optimizing different mission performance goals, the CNO established the SSN-21 top-level requirements in 1984. SSN-21 will meet or exceed all top level requirements when delivered in 1995.

AN/BSY-2 COMBAT SYSTEM

Issue: AN/BSY-2 Design Changes resulted in $SM cost to redesign SSN-21.
Navy Response: Partially concur. “Design changes” were due to differences between early engineering estimates and final contract design specifications. Cost increase is estimated; the final cost not yet been negotiated.

Issue: Although Navy Operational Test and Evaluation Force stated the AN/BSY-2 has the potential for improved effectiveness over prior systems, this cannot be demonstrated until the system is operationally tested. Also, no alternative system is planned.

Navy Response: Partially concur. Full operational testing will not take place until June 1995. Prior to that event, however, significant testing will take place. The BSY -2 combat system modular design allows parallel development, with incremental testing and delivery. Incremental testing allows early identification and correction of deficiencies which reduces design and schedule risk. A fully capable land based testing facility will be constructed and will be used for interim operational testing commencing in September 1993. This combination of modular development, incremental testing and extensive use of land based testing will allow accurate assessments of AN/BSY -2 development progress and makes an alternative system for the AN/BSY-2 unnecessary.

Issue: AN/BSY-2 program is behind schedule. Two Navy design reviews were delayed about five months.
Navy Response: Partially concur. AN/BSY -2 will be completed in time for delivery to the first SSN-21 on schedule. The Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and Critical Design Review (CDR) were rescheduled to allow more maturity in design specification. The Executive 1 Sessions for the PDR were held 3 October 89 and for the tDR 30 January 90, as rescheduled. Delaying these reviews is expected to pay large dividends downstream through the reduction of engineering changes that frequently result from pre-mature freezing of design specifications. The contract with General Electric requires delivery of the first BSY-2 system four months prior to the date the Government must provide it to the shipbuilder, providing additional schedule margin. A design coordination working group has been established to ensure that all parties are sharing design concerns and issues. This group, consisting of the SSN-21 and BSY-2 program offices, General Electric (GE) and Newport News, will act to further mitigate schedule risks.

Issue: The first AN/BSY-2 will not be fully capable when delivered to the Navy Navy
Response: Partially concur. SSN-21 will commission in May of 1995 with a fully capable BSY-2 combat system. The co~bat system delivered to the Navy in November 1993 will include all hardware and the software necessary to provide full end-to-end combat system capability on all arrays except the medium frequency active and the towed array ranging program. The final increment of software to provide full capability will be delivered in November 1994. This staggered delivery schedule was selected to reduce software development cost and schedule risks.

Issue: AN/BSY-2 software bas development risks due to lack of retained code from prior systems. Navy Response: Do not concur; the opposite is true. Retaining code from prior systems would increase risk due to differences between the BSY -2 and past systems in the areas of architecture and partitioning, depth and quality of documentation, interface definition, standards and conventions used, and language and operating systems compatibility.

Issue: Tests of critical AN/BSY-2 system items have been delayed. Navy Response: Partially concur. While the start of some testing was deferred up to four months, all tests were completed within original schedule time frames. Tests were scheduled early to allow time if problems arose. Key tests such as beam former integrated circuit performance, wide aperture array flow noise, and cathode ray tube reliability, have been successfully completed. Remaining critical item tests are on track to support systems deliveries.

Issue: Institute for defense Analysis (IDA) report stated that GE was “interpreting the DOD-SID-2167 literally and is producing excessive amounts of noninformative documentation.” Navy Response: Partially concur. The initial documents reviewed by IDA did indicate excessive, non-informative documentation was being produced. The Navy’s implementation of DOD-STD-2167 has been heavily tailored, (as encouraged by the DOD Standard), to reduce the amounts and types of documentation required. The Navy is continuing to work with GE to further reduce program documentation to that necessary for efficient program management.

Issue. DOD 3405-2 requires use of Ada programming language unless waivers are granted. AN/BSY -2 use programming languages other than Ada. Are all required waivers granted? Navy Response: Four different programming languages, in addition to Ada, have been used in the development of the AN/BSY -2. Two are required by the use of the EMSP which was mandated by Congress. They are:

• ECOS – Used in the Enhanced Modular Signal Processor (EMSP) (SEM B Version),
• CMS-2 – Used in the UYK-44 interface to the EMSP. Waivers were requested in both cases but are not required since Ada was not available for the EMSP. The other programming languages being used are:
• C programming Language – Used in the Database Management System to permit the use of commercial software, a specific exception allowed by Dod Directive 3405-2. A waiver has been granted.
• Assembly Language – Used when Ada is too slow to meet requirements for system operation, a specific exception allowed by Navy T ADST AND C. A waiver is not required.

Issue: IDA study reported that GE is not using the Ada Program Design Language (PDL) for AN/BSY-2 software design. Navy Response: Do not concur. General Electric is using the Ada PDL, as required by their contract with the Navy, and is requiring it’s use by all subcontractors.

Issue: IDA study criticized the initial training program set up by GE for it’s newly hired yet inexperienced Ada programmers. Navy Response: Concur. GE’s Ada training program was initially weak. Significant improvement has been achieved through the use of standardized training program among GE and it’s subcontractors, mandatory lab work-shops, and frequently monitored testing. Independent testing by outside organizations places GE students in top third percentile of the programmer base. Ninety-seven percent of the required programming staff is in place.

Issue: IDA study states that “GE Is modifying both the Ada compiler and the Ada run-time system.” This raises the question of requirements to revalidate the compiler. Navy Response: Partially concur. GE discovered a “bug” in the validated compiler which the manufacturer, VERDIX, corrected. VERDIX is revalidating their compiler and is contractually bound to provide updates of this compiler to GE. The AN/BSY-2 Program Office is closely monitoring all efforts in this regard to ensure full compliance with DoD requirements for Ada programs.

Issue: IDA study notes that GE planned to develop a library of re-usable Ada components to speed software development but GE  had not yet specified their exact plan. Navy Response: Do not concur. GE has a defined plan for a reusable software library. It is in accordance with required reference documents and was developed after studying previous efforts.

Issue: IDA study questioned the fact that NUSC is being used as both Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) and Technical Direction Agent (TDA), doubting that NUSC can maintain the separation necessary to adequately perform it’s role of IV&V. Navy Response: Partially concur. The AN/BSY -2 Program Office is closely monitoring the ability of NUSC to perform it’s duties of IV & V. The program manager has contracted with an independent firm (MITRE Corp.} to conduct appraisals of software development. Additionally, NUSC has hired additional personnel to strengthen their ability to fulfill this vital role. This area requires close attention and is receiving it.

Issue: AN/BSY-2 cost was reported as increasing by $140M between the end or 1988 and 1989. Navy Response: Concur. $122M of the $140M was the result of changes due to inflationary indexes. The remainder was due to the Navy shifting all EMSPs to the SEM “E” version .