As I read the October 1993 Submarine Review, I couldn’tA help but wonder if the Submarine Force was missing a message from the broadcast files of November 1992. Though I failed to retain a copy of the specific message, I think it went something like this:
FM: THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
INFO: THE U.S. CONGRESS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNCLAS//N00000/1
SUBJ: NATIONAL CONCERNS
- THANKS FOR WINNING THE COLD WAR, BUT WHAT HAVE YOU DONE FOR US LATELY.
- DOMESTIC ISSUES ARE AT THE TOP OF OUR PRIORITY LIST.
- ENJOY YOUR RETIREMENT.
No longer does the threat of attack by the Soviet Union loom as a major concern for the American public. In fact, when most Americans look across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans they see calm and tranquil seas. The regional crises of Europe, Africa, and Asia are well beyond their horizon. However, as they turn around, the reality of crime, racism, poverty, sexual harassment, unemployment, lack of health care, budget deficits, and ever-increasing taxes confront them and they ask, “Why aren’t we fixing our own problems? AMERICA FIRST!”
President Clinton was not elected because the voters considered him more capable than George Bush, but because his vision of the future was closely aligned with theirs. Many of us in the military could not believe that the citizenry of the United States would elect President Clinton. Why? We failed to recognize that the vision he shared with people around the country was creating excitement and energy. He proved again that a shared vision can create a common sense of purpose, values, and identity. Ultimately, a true shared vision will compel commitment and courage. People will do whatever is necessary to achieve the vision, if they are truly committed. A shared vision can lift an organization or a country out of the doldrums and carry it to new heights.
Why is this important for the military to recognize? A vision of prosperity, quality education and health care, full employment, crime-free cities, with equal opportunities for everyone, looks nothing like current reality. The gap between the vision and current reality has created tension which, because of limited fiscal resources, has placed the military at odds with the American public. This tension can only be resolved one of two ways: either by pulling reality toward the vision or by pulling the vision toward reality.
If one takes time to examine the American vision, as I’ve described it, I’m sure some questions will come to mind. Is it correct? Maybe. Is it focused? Somewhat. Is it strong’} You bet! It has already driven the election of a new president, forced major cuts in the budget, and provided the impetus for possible future improvements in health care and anti-crime efforts.
Why do we in the military even care? This shared American vision continues to grow in size and strength. As a result, the tension between current reality and the American vision will largely be resolved by pulling reality toward the vision, not by pulling the vision toward reality.
For the Submarine Force this translates into further reductions. As we have already seen, the 1992 National Military Strategy Base Force was only a roadside rest area on the downsizing highway. Much the same, we should expect only a quick pit stop at the levels established in the Bottom-Up Review. Already, some experts project that the DOD budget will decrease further from $260 billion in 1994 to $190 billion in 2000, another 25% cut.
What relevance does this hold for a Submarine Force vision? No longer can we measure our self-worth in terms of how many SSNs and SSBNs we retain in the force. This parochial view of the last few years is a self-defeating vision. Our numbers will undoubtedly continue to drop even below the levels planned in the Bottom-Up Review. Linking our prestige with numbers of submarines will only diminish the elan and spirit of our force.
How then do we build a shared vision for the Submarine Force that is positive and energizing, while consistent with that of the American public? It starts not by asking how much of the force can we retain {our current mindset) or by defending current force levels by trying to sell our capability to conduct a wide variety of warfare tasks, some of which we don’t do very well (e.g. minehunting) or can be done better by other forces (e.g. conventional land strike).
My challenge is to ask yourself, “Does the U.S . military even need submarines? That’s right, why not decommission the entire force? If you start the analysis at this point, you are forced to ask the bard questions, the ones that are crucial to the development of our future vision.
What unique capabilities do we provide to the unified combat-ant commanders (CINCs) and national leaders?
What warfare tasks do we conduct best?
If you conclude, after answering these questions, that submarines do bring vital and necessary capabilities to the battlefield, you can then go on to evaluate the threat and the effect of fiscal constraints.
When I answer these questions, I see a future Submarine Force that is small and specialized. Warships whose mission capabilities are based on stealth. Ballistic missile submarines, though limited in number, will be the premier strategic deterrent and, if necessary, strike platforms in the U.S. military. Attack submarines will have no equal in ASW, ASUW, and intelligence collection.
What do I want for this force? I want men that are the best trained in the world. I want to be able to send every man on my ship to necessary schools without being told there are no quotas remaining or there are insufficient TAD funds. I want a crew that is fully manned, not to 90 percent as the current POM projects. I want the best quality of life for my men and their families; for example, improved monetary compensation for junior men, suitable housing or increased housing allowances including BEQs for the single men, well supported MWR programs and facilities, reliable child care, improved education and advancement opportunities. I want an operating schedule that allows my crew to train in order to be fully combat ready, but not one that results in excessive out-of-homeport time. I want sufficient funding and IMA support in order to maintain my ship in the 4.0 material condition that has been the force’s legacy. I want an elite force that is still proud to be called the Silent Service.
In summary, I write this article because as the Submarine Force evolves, I want to help shape it. What I don’t want is a force that has retained too much structure and, as a result, is undermanned and underfunded. My message is simple: Don’t be satisfied with being told what the vision will be. Be part of the process, part of the dialogue, that is essential to the development of a shared vision. Write to this periodical or others, talk with your ship-mates, and continue the dialogue. As a current or past Dolphin wearer, it’s your responsibility!
