This book presents some interesting perspectives on the future of our military forces and influences of international and domestic pressures that will impact U.S. defense effectiveness in the coming decades.
Using the term in irons to indicate the state in which a ship would drift in a windless sea as the crew suffered the agonies of slow death, Harlan Ullman applies this term to the possible future of a defense establishment that is beset by complacency brought on by the lack of a credible international threat, increasing competition for the federal dollar, and the general public’s perception of U.S. military superiority. The book is a cleverly woven logic screen through which the author passes ideas and concepts, weeding out those options that do not appear practical or sensible, and examining the results that remain in order to reach recommended conclusions.
Using the term in irons to indicate the state in which a ship would drift in a windless sea as the crew suffered the agonies of slow death, Harlan Ullman applies this term to the possible future of a defense establishment that is beset by complacency brought on by the lack of a credible international threat, increasing competition for the federal dollar, and the general public’s perception of U.S. military superiority. The book is a cleverly woven logic screen through which the author passes ideas and concepts, weeding out those options that do not appear practical or sensible, and examining the results that remain in order to reach recommended conclusions.
The U.S. military establishment, having experienced the challenges and problems associated with four drawdowns since 1945, is now faced with a set of new problems that may well change the very character of the armed services. The series of analyses that constitute this book begins with a study of the history of these four drawdowns: the post WWII drawdown overseen by President Truman; the post Korean drawdown in President Eisenhower’s administration; the post Vietnam reduction lasting to President Carter; and the base force reduction at the end of the Cold War started by President Bush and continued by President Clinton’s Bottom-up Review (BUR). Currently the BUR is the basis for defense budgeting, but the cost estimates are too low and the range of mission responsibilities for DOD is too broad, having “established new roles and objectives that exceeded both the authority and capacity of DOD to address ineffective and comprehensive ways” .(p.46) This factor, combined with the underfunding stated in the BUR, set up the military for a hollow force future. But it is a future which can be avoided.
After this background on drawdowns, there begins a discussion of strategic uncertainty that ends with the conclusion that .. the world of the new century may in fact not be as dangerous a place as some suggest regarding absolute or relative risks to the United States”.(p. 60) Somewhat glossed over in this evaluation are the risks from nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, terror promoting states, or a former Soviet Union member now unencumbered by a strong central government and disciplined military. Nonetheless, the author presents a credible argument that external threats to the United States have diminished, certainly in the minds of the populace if not in reality. But the U.S. will still need standing forces to protect itself in what is still a complex and dangerous world.
Adding to the military’s problem with public perception of a reduced threat is that growing preoccupation with domestic problems, the inability of the government to come to grips with economic and budgetary issues, and the fact that national defense funds are becoming increasingly synonymous with discretionary funds to the exclusion of entitlements and other domestic accounts. In the author’s words:
” … non-discretionary or mandatory spending-that is, accounts the government is legally obligated to pay, such as entitlements and interest-have grown to about 70 percent of the $1.5 trillion annual federal budget. Of the remaining third of the budget that is discretionary, about 60 percent goes to defense and the remaining 40 percent goes to discretionary entitlement programs that are all domestic in nature. “(p. 69)
The focal point of this discussion is that the process of defense downsizing is prone to a slow evolution because of inaction or inattention, and that such an evolution would not necessarily avoid hollow forces unless and until the situation became demanding of remedial action or a new threat developed.
Having dealt with problems facing military budgeting, Ullman turns to a discussion of military underfunding. The severe underfunding of the military budget is placed at $120-150 billion in the current five year budget.(p. 78) Three scenarios emerge from this discussion as possible future outcomes: a hollow force resulting from continued underfunding of the BUR force structure; provision of adequate funding for the BUR (with all the budgetary, tax, and economic implications); or a revised national security policy.
Force structure, including organizational relationships as well as individual morale and esprit de corps, is impacted by many factors: the defense budget; priorities of force basing; weapons systems and organization of fighting power; proportion of forces forward deployed; readiness levels; dependence on reserves; mobilization and reconstitution; emphasis on modernization; rates of integrating modem technology; and degree of reliance on allies, international organizations, and other policy instruments. (p. 110) There follows an examination of force structure and budgets which seeks to answer the following questions:
- What forces are needed?
- What force capability and structure can be sustained and justified politically and economically?
- How can we get from where we are now to where we want to be while maintaining security and affordability?
Based on historical comparisons across administrations from Truman to Bush, the answers provided envision a force level between 750,000 and 1.4 million supported by about four percent of the gross domestic product (between $150 billion and $270 billion in 1994 dollars). The type of force structures considered are the “garrison force” envisioning permanent land based deployments to various regions (discarded because of inherent inflexibility); a maritime force requiring principal reliance on naval forces (discarded because of “stifling interservice rivalry and pernicious results for the nation”); reconstitution, using a base force and heavy reliance on reserves (discarded because it would be viewed as “American entrenchment” and “exacerbate uncertainty and possibly instability with the demise or decay of U.S. leadership”). Maximum versus staggered readiness (where only some units would be at full readiness at any given time) is also considered.
The author then considers the possibility of reducing commitments and presence in order to permit reduced force levels. Presence comes under particular attack for its ineffectiveness in preventing adverse actions or providing any significant advantage in their event, except for the advantage of access. Minimal reserves and guard forces are also recommended. To reduce the costs involved in maintaining deployed forces, the author suggests a method of providing more limited presence by the quality and timing of the deployment rather than by the quantity or length of deployments (i.e., be smart in demonstrating commitments). Guaranteeing access by means of agreements for port facilities, overflights, supply bases, etc., is viewed as more useful than demonstrating commitment.
Staggered readiness would further reduce costs without severely compromising the capability to deploy and fight quickly. To ensure the capability to handle one-plus (military regional conflicts) MRCs, the U.S. has to forge new regional and local alliances that will work much like NATO and can be focused by regional forums modeled after the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to bring stability and security to each region of the world, whether it be the Middle East, Asia or Africa.
On the administrative side, the tail has been outmaneuvering (and currently outspending by about 2: 1) the teeth for too long, and it is time to implement base closings and, more importantly, realignments, that will allow the services to continue maintaining, training, equipping and supplying troops in an efficient and effective manner. Further cost reductions can be achieved by providing for acquisition reform, since current support levels are about 10 percent of the total DOD budget (i.e., $20-30 billion per year according to Secretary of Defense William Perry) for procurement regulation and oversight. Furthermore, the percentage of funds devoted to infrastructure support is increasing while “teeth” receive less. (p. 157)
Expanding on this triple branched scheme for the future, the author observes that there is an absence of vital strategy which will make it likely that “severe compression and contractions in military might are inevitable” .(p. 106) The three options are now renamed as follows:
- Steady as you go (i.e., take no action)
- Fund the BUR force (i.e., free up resources needed)
- Readjust and change
The “steady as you go” option will lead to a hollow force as funding erodes and the infrastructure chews up greater and greater proportions of available resources. The “fund the BUR force” option is not viable in today’s climate of a dimly perceived major threat and competition by domestic programs for the federal dollar combined with the improbability of a tax increase. The “readjust and change” option has the greatest potential for preserving the
quality of our defense establishment. This option requires efforts to reduce costs for infrastructure, reserve and guard forces, acquisition, and forward presence while forming alliances that will fill the gaps thus created and ensure the capability to react effectively to one-plus MRCs.
The final recommendations under the “readjust and change” approach include a revised force level and structure that assumes a one-plus scenario for MRCs wherein the U.S. would be able to fight one MRC with regular forces and a second MRC with somewhat reduced levels of reserves and guard forces, and allied forces. The structure would be basically an extension of the BUR force structure, with no service having a radical change in mission or force levels. Lastly, the author suggests a mechanism by which national leaders could examine and select a fitting force structure and budget allocation for defense.
The recommended solutions laid out by Ullman are logical and straightforward. While the author does acknowledge that unforeseen conflicts could cause a reversal in force reductions, the harsh reality of the political process is not fully dealt with. The neatly packaged solutions are not likely to be accepted. Yet whatever finally emerges, the book provides a foundation for the commencement of discussion and planning that is urgently needed to keep the military out of irons. Furthermore, while the book requires close reading and some work by the reader to organize ideas and identify themes, it is nonetheless a thought provoking approach to the major questions facing our national political and military leaders, and fully deserves the time required to gain added perspective on these questions and related issues. It is also a warning shot across the bow of our Ship of State that the time to consider, readjust, and change is now, before events and circumstances allow our military establishment to drift into a downward spiral from which recovery will be difficult. To paraphrase Coleridge’s The Rime of the Ancient Mariner:
Down drops the breeze, the sails dropt down,
‘Twas sad as sad could be,ยท
And we must speak now to break
The silence of the sea.
