THE BATTLEGROUP COMMANDER’S MOST UNUSED ASSET: THE SUBMARINE

An award-winning essay from the Naval Submarine League sponsored contest at the Submarine Officer Advanced Course at the USN Submarine School.

Naval Expeditionary Forces – Shaped for Joint Operations Operating Forward From the Sea – Tailored for National Needs

“The Navy will be part of a sea-air-land team trained to respond immediately to the Unified Commanders as they execute national policy.” “Naval Forces will concentrate on littoral warfare and maneuver from the sea.” These are quotes from the Secretary of the Navy’s white paper … From the Sea of 1992 defining new roles for the nation’s Navy in the maritime strategy . … From the Sea directs the Navy commander to shift his warfighting philosophy from open ocean, blue water naval strategy to those strategies best suited for close-in coastal operations. Littoral operations would include shallow-water operations with congested airspace within the enemy’s own territory. With military emergencies such as Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti, it is evident that this policy is in effect. However, examining the tactics used by today’s battle-group commanders, evidently they still do not understand the versatility of all assets at their ready. Specifically, it appears that battlegroup commanders do not understand the multi-mission capability of a submarine. This results in failure to use the submarine to its maximum effectiveness.

The end of the Soviet Empire has resulted in a chaotic perspective of the enemy leaving an unclear picture of the true world threat. It has become more difficult to figure out who is the enemy, obtain intelligence or even just detect their motive. The world is much less a kinder and gentler place than it once was.

From the Navy’s perspective, we must be ready to carry the fight to the enemy from the sea. Proliferation of arms by small countries has become relatively easy. Of particular threat to the U.S. naval force is the diesel submarine. For a naval force to adequately achieve battlespace dominance, it must be able to counter the threat from air, land and sea. What better way to dominate the sea than by using a sensor and weapon system that operates within the same plane as the threat? The submarine operates in concert with the ocean to counter the enemy maritime threat from beneath the ocean surface.

Well, it may sound obvious that a submarine would be the best weapon to use against a submerged threat, but it has been my observation of real world operations, exercises and wargames that the use of a submarine is often considered a burden to surface ASW forces. The potential for BLUE on BLUE engagement restrains the surface forces in an ASW attack. If a friendly submarine is operating in the same Joint Tactical Action area, friendly surface forces must positively identify the location of the submarine before executing an attack. Submarines are difficult to communicate with and are even more difficult to locate. The hesitation to attack results in the lack of desire to work in tandem with a submarine.

counter the threat from air, land and sea. What better way to dominate the sea than by using a sensor and weapon system that operates within the same plane as the threat? The submarine operates in concert with the ocean to counter the enemy maritime threat from beneath the ocean surface. Well, it may sound obvious that a submarine would be the best weapon to use against a submerged threat, but it has been my observation of real world operations, exercises and wargames that the use of a submarine is often considered a burden to surface ASW forces. The potential for BLUE on BLUE engagement restrains the surface forces in an ASW attack. If a friendly submarine is operating in the same Joint Tactical Action area, friendly surface forces must positively identify the location of the submarine before executing an attack. Submarines are difficult to communicate with and are even more difficult to locate. The hesitation to attack results in the lack of desire to work in tandem with a submarine. To illustrate, I provide the following example from a recent wargame matching students from Submarine Officer’s Advanced Course (SOAC) with their surface community counterparts, Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) in Newport, Rhode Island. Both groups of students are experienced specialists in their own community. In brief, the scenario was: A Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) to evacuate approximately 2000 BLUE citizens from the BLUE embassy in country GREEN. Country GREEN is a small country situated on a coast adjacent to country ORANGE. Hostilities are escalating between GREEN and ORANGE and BLUE forces aligned with GREEN. We are the BLUE force and our assignment is to plan the rescue mission. ORANGE forces have a strong naval threat relative to the rest of the region consisting of an aircraft carrier, several small combatant ships and five diesel submarines. BLUE forces consist of an aircraft carrier and support ships, an amphibious ready group for the evacuation and two submarines.

The submarine officers were not able to attend the planning phase of the operation. Thus, the mission was planned solely by the SWOS students. This opportunity allowed me to examine the inherent difference in paradigms between surface and submarine doctrine. As expected, the SWOS students planned the mission well within their familiar frame of reference. In doing so, they failed to fully achieve the goal of the exercise which was to maximize the use of available forces to efficiently conduct the NEO. Specifically, the operation was conducted almost completely with surface and tactical air forces. Apparently no regard was given to the fact that there were five rogue enemy submarines that had not been located at the start of the problem. My prediction was that it would have been simple for one or two of the enemy submarines to lie in wait on the track of the surface forces. The way the game played out is really unimportant to this discussion (the surface guys got lucky).

The friendly submarines were remotely placed and virtually rendered ineffective. Both of the assigned SSNs were vertical launch (VLS) missile shooters. One unit was assigned marker operations to follow the ORANGE aircraft carrier. The second SSN’s role was ASW, to hunt for ORANGE diesel submarines-good in theory but the SSN was placed astern of the aircraft carrier and amphibious ready group rending the BLUE submarine ineffective. The amphibious ready group and aircraft carrier were placed at extreme risk entering a war zone with five unlocated enemy submarines. The only real means of detecting them was behind the battlegroup.

Now, had the SOAC students been included in the plan to counter the tactical maritime threat (the diesel submarines and surface forces in the area), the following methods and missions of the SSN may have been implemented: Insert the SSNs weeks in advance to monitor GREEN and ORANGE military activity in an interdiction and warning (l&W) mission. Insert a SEAL or Marine reconnaissance team early to provide on-site advanced intelligence for the amphibious landing. As D-day approaches, the SSNs should begin an ASW sweep down the corridor the amphibious ready group intends to sail, thus clearing any enemy submarine threats from the area. As the amphibious ready group enters the theater to conduct its NEO, the SSN has covertly created a safe path. The SSN can continue guarding the BLUE surface force’s flank in concert with other BLUE surface and air ASW forces. Should ORANGE force threats become apparent, the SSN can be readily tasked to counter the threat. In parallel with this guard mission, the VLS equipped SSN can plan a TLAM strike provided by the National Command Authority if consistent with the mission. Finally, as the amphibious ready group and the aircraft carrier groups depart the area, the SSN could clear ahead of the battlegroup any submarine threats that position to intercept.

The paragraphs above are not meant to criticize surface warfare tactics. They are to illustrate the inherent differences in the tactical planning conducted by surface warfare planners and submarine tacticians. As stated in … From the Sea, the primary goal in theater is “ultimate battlespace dominance”. The stealth and covertness of the submarine act as a force multiplier to allow it to change missions rapidly. I submit that in the wargame scenario, it was amateurs planning the mission. Again I state, the wargame exercise illustrates the differences between the paradigms of the Surface Force and the Submarine Force. Submariners would do no better if we were attempting to plan the tactical air strategy. I introduce the synergistic approach. Neither the surface forces nor the submarine forces are independently qualified to plan a mission such as this. Current battlegroup operations do divide the warfare commanders up to micro-manage their assets. My observation is that no one has adequately used experts from all forces to truly plan an operation to achieve its maximum effectiveness.

When questioning the SWOS students about why they did not make better use of the assigned subs, interesting misconceptions were noted. One response highlighted was “although submarines are multi-mission, they can only conduct one mission at a time”. True statement. However, the submarine can change roles and missions as fast as you can say “Dudley Mush Morton”. As illustrated above, a submarine can move from one mission to the next in a matter of hours and can perform functions of multiple missions simultaneously. A second reason stated for not using submarines was that it was too difficult to communicate with the submarines. Water space management issues become too difficult to resolve in a hot war situation. This just takes training. Just because it is difficult does not mean it cannot be accomplished. During my tour in the Operations Department at COMSUBLANT, I witnessed the growing pains of battlegroup operations by participating in several fleet exercises in which tactical command of the two to three submarines was shifted to the battlegroup commander. No doubt communications with the submarines were difficult, but the lesson learned was that you had to plan. The concept of submarine broadcast delivery time seemed somewhat of an enigma to surface forces for a long time. The SSN does not need to communicate with multiple warfare commanders at any given time. The SSN is an extended weapon and sensor system and needs only to report to the ASW commander.

Clearly the threats encountered in the above scenario are very real today. These threats are often considered as two-dimensional. By two-dimensional, I mean that the surface force has two primary missions: the short term, tactical mission-to protect the aircraft carrier, and the long term mission of logistics-sustaining operations over long periods. The submarine brings the third dimension to the table: the maritime mission-guarding against the threats in the ocean. The ASW maritime threat develops much slower than the tactical air picture. An ASW threat may take several days to manifest itself and several more days to exterminate. To adequately plan for such a threat, the battlegroup commander must surround himself with type commander level submarine experts. These are experts in maritime tactics that can most effectively advise the battlegroup commander on the best method of countering the threat at sea approaching the littoral waters.

Not all the faults lie with battlegroup commanders. Submariners are not as proactive as they could be in helping the battle-group commander solve his problem. Submariners are raised to be independent tactical thinkers of the Cold War doctrine and of their World War II predecessors. During my shore tour at COMSUBLANT, I noted reluctance to provide a submarine asset under the tactical command of the battlegroup. The reluctance stemmed from concerns for waterspace management (preventing BLUE on BLUE engagement) and from prevention of mutual interference (preventing BLUE bumping BLUE) standpoint. The submarine operations specialists felt that the battlegroup qualifications were not up to the task. Vice Admiral Emery bad the vision to see how the Submarine Force must assert itself and be involved in the littoral environment or be left behind. Therefore, this was a paradigm we had to change. It is much easier to stand back and criticize rather than take the proactive approach to work with the battlegroup commander. For us as submariners, providing our tactical expertise to the battlegroup commander will greatly enhance the ability to achieve that synergistic relationship resulting in more effective mission employment.

To conclude, battlegroup operations in littoral waters are tough. I think there are two fundamental ways to reduce the difficulty. First, warfare commanders and battlegroup commanders must realize and truly understand the robust multi-mission capability of the submarine. This can be best done through instruction at the communitys’ department head school. Both SWOS and SOAC provide direct input to the fleet. What I take with me to my next ship is considered the most modern and advanced guidance. Secondly, the battlegroup commander must surround himself with submariners during the tactical planning phase of a mission. The submariner looks at the problem from a third dimension. The ASW threat is more real to the submariner and he has trained his whole professional life to counter this threat. Let him aid in the planning.

As well evidenced in recent years, the small littoral conflict will not go away soon. Keys to success are to understand the forces available, tailor those forces to anticipate the threat and support the national needs.