A NEW PERSPECTIVE
Many readers of THE SUBMARINE REVIEW will be familiar with the legacy of Admiral Lockwood and the attributions of egregious failure of the Bureau of Ordnance to address rapidly problems with the mainstay torpedo of World War II, the Mark 14. However, new information has come to light that will render a substantial new rewriting of this history. The purpose of this paper is to present some of this critical information, as well as to place some of it in a broader, deeper historical context.
The Ongoing Record of Torpedo Development
I would first call attention to the apparent failings of the written record of the war to represent accurately a sequence of events critical to this inquiry. For example, the Mark 14’s exploder, ultimately dubbed the Mark 6, introduced in the 1920s, was tested only twice before the war- in 1926. These two tests were remarkable. One official photograph of the result of one of these tests (see Figure 1) shows an experimental torpedo armed with the Mark 6 inertia-contact magnetic-influence exploder mechanism running under the keel of the hulked submarine L-8. One sees only the bubbles of the trail of the torpedo’s path athwart the keel of the target. The other test (see Figure 2) sank the venerable old sub performing its last duty with an under-keel shot. In this photograph one can see the desired effect of the magnetic-influence exploder, which is the breaking of the back of the target’s keel from the upward-directed plume of the warhead’s explosion. The live fire tests thus yielded a 50% success.
Later, during World War II, the Bureau of Ordnance required a 50% success rate for the radio-controlled Proximity Fuze to move from experimentation to production. During the crucial test with the radio-controlled fuze in a 5″/38 anti-aircraft (AA) shell following development of radio-controlled fire over many months, three drone aircraft were sacrificed and shot out of the sky in a demonstration for BuOrd. It was decided not to risk loss of the fourth test drone, the Army Air Force having objected to the destruction of these expensive targets. This was followed by a “three hits, three runs, no errors” communication back to Section T. The game was on- leading to the development, testing, production and use of millions of VT (variable time) Proximity Fuzes for numerous Navy and Army projectiles by the end of the war.
The apparent justification for the two-shot experimental procedure in the case of the magnetic-influence exploder was the expense of live fire-demolished test vessels destroyed, and expensive test torpedoes destroyed. So, the first two years of the war were the real experimental test period for the Mark 14-a colossal failure for which, in Naval tradition of individuals taking blame, skippers were found ultimately at fault for duds an apparent misses. This was ultimately much more costly. For those involved, the marks on their records are unfortunate from what we now know. These records perhaps could, and should, be amended. Later wartime tests of the depth-maintenance mechanism found that these torpedoes ran deeper than designed. Of course, any testing with inert warheads designed so that the torpedo would float after running was bound to be misleading, and it was. Competent skippers were likely lost.
Even the written record as we can examine it today fails to answer important questions. The Mark t 4 Mod 0 was followed by the Mark 14 Mod I, 2, and 3. OP 635, in Record Group 74 (Bureau of Ordnance) is titled “Torpedoes Mark 14 and Mark 14 Mods 1, 2, and 3- Description, Operation, Adjustment and Care.” It is dated, significantly, 24 March 1945. Remarkably, this demonstrates one of greatest problems in conducting research on torpedo development during this war; the great time lag between modifications and publication of such procedural manuals, during
which significant research, dissemination, and change was already coming down the line to operational level in the Fleet None of the personal public accounts written between 1945 and 1996 apparently contain any such information, inspiring and accurate as they may have been, regarding other aspects of submarine warfare. Also, there was an earlier nomenclature for identifying manuals, which I will discuss in a future article.
Many researchers in such military areas have confronted the nature of the historical record and the great effect declassification review has on it. Many official U.S. Navy documents of WWII vintage have mixed SECRET, CLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, and RESTRICTED components within the same document (the nature and implications of these mixed designations is beyond the scope of this paper). To its credit, the Historical Naval Ships Association (HNSA) has done a great service in making more of the written record available, not only to researchers, but also to the general public when possible. In this way, modern research will improve significantly in quality and scope. On the other hand, for the serious researcher, the on-line versions are often not 100% complete. In my experience, it is still necessary to find and examine the original document, unexpurgated and unabridged, for critical clarifications. Whenever possible, when I am unable to examine the original documents or a copy with suitable provenance, I will indicate so in the references. This applies to many documents referenced in this paper as well.
These accounts were no doubt important for public relations leading to the development of the military-industrial complex, which relied on taxes and the interest and support of the taxpaying public for its major successes in subsequent decades of the Cold War. The existence of the National Defense Research Council (NDRC) and the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) had been disclosed. However, these book club tomes were generally 1101 “gee wiz” type accounts of the role of science and advanced engineering in prosecuting a quick end to the war.
They were serious studies of different aspects of OSRD work within the bound of SECRET, CLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL,
and RESTRICTED classifications of much of the work. They were certainly much more scholarly than, say, Popular Science or Popular Mechanics. My point is that the serious academic researcher or even philologist had to wait decades for access to the kind of material that I refer to here.
Following upon the war (which, for veterans’ purposes, continued into 1946), many publications touted the accomplishments in turning scientific advances to application on the battlefront, land, sea, and air. One such volume authorized by the Navy has a brief (ten page) summary of various scientific contributions to the Navy’s air war. The torpedo issues dealt with in my previous article (the Mark 13 air to surface torpedo launched from the Avenger) are not mentioned, nor is any other major torpedo problem. Magnetic Airborne Detection (MAD) is dealt with in one paragraph (p. 377). Although they are interesting, these types of books were meant primarily to satisfy public curiosity and are of minimal value to the serious researcher. Today they might be slanted also to justify expenditure of taxes. During WWII this was not the case – the relative wartime expenditure on scientific development was small compared to the overall cost of the war. Also, government bonds to pay for the war were eagerly bought and promoted by the government for what was generally regarded as a just and moral conflict.
An excellent parallel case study is that such a significant advancement as the Proximity Fuze was not really declassified in significant detail until 1976. Some have called it “the mini atomic bomb.” Following this, Dr. Ralph Belknap Baldwin, who worked on Section T Proximity Fuze contracts and liaison with the U.S. Army was able to publish the landmark The Deadly Fuze in 1980,6 and They Never Knew What Hit Them in 1999. 7 Having “been there” he most definitely had an inside track on producing these books. Dr. Baldwin was also the liaison from Section T to the U.S. Army. Five years prior to his recruitment into Section T, he had earned his doctorate in astronomy at the University of Michigan in 1937.
Evolution of the Mark 14
Who would be surprised to find out, today, that before the publication of OP 635 there was already in existence further modifications of the Mark 6 TEM for the Mark 14 torpedo, Mods 5, 6-5 and 6-6 with effective changes to the original Mark 6 Mod 0 TEM? They were not only already in progress, but also in operation. I believe many in the submarine and academic military community will find this an exciting historic finding. It has almost become a matter of decades of World War II folklore or dogma, in my experience of talking with military and nonmilitary people about the dreadful torpedo that had been a dismal failure during the 1941-1943 period, the Mark 14 with the Mark 6 TEM.
I prepared an article for THE SUBMARINE REVIEW on the subject of Torpedo Exploder Mechanism development under the auspices of”Section T” contracts within Section 6 of the OSRD. This article focused on the development of the Mark 9 TEM. This was a magnetic-influence exploder that operated on different principles than the Mark 6 TEM (and Mods) used with the Mark 14 submarine torpedo (in this early period, the torpedo was often referred to with Roman number designation such as the “Mark XIV”).
I refer the reader to the first article for detailed information on the Mark 9 TEM, which shows its position, as was typical, on the underside of the torpedo. Like the Mark 9 TEM, the Mark 6 TEM was also inserted from the outside of the torpedo hull with 24 screws, thereby allowing replacement of Mark 6 Mod 0 TEM with the subsequent Mark 6 Mods 1, 2, and 3 described in OP 639.
The Mark 9 TEM was a combined inertia-contact magnetic-influence exploder that employed reverse polarized electromagnetic rods to detect changes in a vessel’s magnetic signature directly underneath the keel, where most ships of World War II vintage and earlier were weakest. Most seagoing Naval vessels were best armored on the sides, which led to ineffective direct hits from contact exploders that did not contain warheads powerful enough to pierce the reinforced armor. Perhaps this idea of reinforcement goes back to the Civil War, when a torpedo [mine] was attached by the C.S.S. Hunley to the side of the wooden-hulled U.S.S. Housatonic, sinking this large ship in the Federal blockade of Charleston Harbor in 1864. The Federals began to employ “torpedo nets” hanging from the sides of wooden-hulled warships. The reinforcement of the hull during WWII plagued many submarine, destroyer, PT boat and airplane- launched torpedoes throughout the war.
At one point, firing solutions allowing only ninety degree hits (direct) were permitted, although this did not solve the problem. A new warhead material, Torpex (Torpedo Exploder) was a useful development in compensating for other deficiencies in pre-war ordnance advances.
The Mark 14 torpedo used later in the war was much more successful. Most of these torpedoes were employed in the Pacific theater. What was the change? OP 635 does not give us the answer. I pondered this matter for some time, reaching into many newly available documents until I obtained a publication of the Underwater Ordnance Department on “Mine Disposal” dated 1 October 1944 (CONFIDENTIAL). This is a phenomenal eyeopener. It includes instructions for rendering torpedoes of all types currently in use safe for storage or destruction. It is quite specific and mentions all wartime torpedoes, as well as all previously known and many previously unknown torpedo exploder mechanisms. It shows and describes in great detail many modifications for all known torpedoes during the WWII period. In this manual, I found information not only on the Mark 9 TEM, but also the Mark I 0 TEM. The Mark 10 Mod 3 TEM was intended for use in the Mark 15 Mod 0, Mark 15 Mod 1, Mark 16, and Mark J 7 (and Mods) through JO June 1945. The Mark 10 TEM was also a combined inertia-contact and magnetic-influence exploder device.
This manual also includes specific information on the Mark 6 Mod 5 and Mark 6 Mod 6 Torpedo Exploder Mechanisms which were employed with the Mark 14 torpedo and could be easily inserted in the location of previous modification on the underside of the torpedo. The date of this section of the manual is I October 1944, nearly a year before the end of the war. These were substantially different from the maligned Mark 6 Mod 0 TEM of the early 1941-1943 period of America’s involvement in WWII.
Change No. 6 to the Mine Disposal Manual for Undersea Ordnance, added 10 June 1945 is also pertinent to this discussion. It covers other ordnance, for example, the Mark 15, which was a surface-launched torpedo (e.g. destroyer, except PT boat). The Mark 17 was a submarine-launched torpedo intended to rival the long-distance Japanese Long Lance; 400 were reportedly produced-although combat use statistics are not reported.
The Mark 18 was an electric submarine-launched torpedo, developed by Westinghouse after capture of the deep-running German G7e soon after America’s entry into the war. U-570 (see Figure 3a typical Type VIIC German submarine, the most ubiquitous of the war) was captured under a rare attack by a British Hudson of Squadron 269 on the U- 570’s first war patrol (I August to 27 August 1941, when it was captured), yielding the German G7e torpedo with its unreliable T2 inertia-contact and magnetic-influence exploder. T2 problems were corrected with the T3 exploder under direction of the German BdU (Befehlshaber der U-Boote; Submarine High Command).
The distinct advantage of the electric Mark 18 was that it ran deep and had no wake or bubble trail visible from the surface. The under-keel plume from the explosion was intended to break the back (keel) of the target. I have, to date, found no specific reports of Mark l 8s fired during the war in combat, although information in the Underwater Ordnance Mine Disposal manual refers to torpedoes and TEMs in use; therefore, it is not unreasonable to speculate as to its use. It was in Allied hands throughout the 1941- 43 period of dismal performance of the Mark 14 torpedo.
Also, the only history of the Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station at Keyport, Washington indicates that the Mark 9 TEM was intended for use in the Mark 18 torpedo and was effective in combat. 14 The Applied Physics Laboratory of the University of Washington was contracted along with JHUAPL in the development of the Mark 9 TEM in cooperation with Keyport – the first torpedo development station to follow Newport. Successful firing of the Mark 13 torpedo employing the Mark 9 TEM (inertia-contact and magnetic-influence) apparently sank the behemoth Japanese battleship Yamato in early 1945.
The Mark 9 Mod 3 TEM preliminary manual (OP 1365) was published on 13 March 1945. OP 1369 for the Mark 10 Mod 3 TEM was published on the same date. As both were combined contact-inertia and magnetic-influence type exploders, BuOrd can neither be said to have been unresponsive nor bumbling in reaction to the Mark 14 debacle as is often implied – or outright accused. These new TEMs were obviously in service long before the end of the war and undoubtedly helped to shorten it. These two papers in combination should go some distance in vindication of the Bureau of Ordnance under Rear Admiral, and later Admiral George Hussey, Jr., as well as Admiral Lockwood.
New Exploders for the Mark 14 Submarine Torpedo
There were a number of precursors to the Mark 6 Mod 5 and Mark 6 Mod 6 TEMs (Mods I, 2, 3, 4a and 4b ). Under tremendous pressure from Admiral Lockwood, Admiral Nimitz eventually ordered turning off of the magnetic- influence portion of the Mark 14 torpedo to the portions of the Pacific Fleet under the command of Admiral Lockwood on 24 June 1943. An interesting footnote to this affair is that Rear Admiral Ralph Christie, inventor of the Mark 6 magnetic-influence exploder mechanism, did not follow this command immediately under his South Pacific domain, although ultimately, he fell into line with orders.15 Christie lamented in his diary, “Today, the long hard battle on the Mark VI magnetic feature ends- with defeat. I am forced to inactivate all magnetic exploders. We are licked.”
This change did not solve all of the Mark 14’s problems; prematures were reduced, but deficiencies in the contact-inertia component became more apparent, as torpedoes that were heard to hit the hulls of their targets did not fire. One can imagine Christie’s dismay- as a line officer, he would not have been privy to the extensive research and development already under way. Christie’s basic idea was vindicated. After the war, the magnetic-influence concept underwent even further development; this will be the topic of a future report.
Analysis of Later Developments for the Mark 14
Mark 6 TEM Mods 5 and 6 were substantially different from all of the previous exploders used in the Mark 14 torpedo. They therefore merit closer examination here. First, the firing speed of the impact-inertia device was increased through the use of an electronic detonator, as opposed to the mechanical detonator originally used. Because electronic detonation was employed, the percussion striker and trigger assemblies were eliminated.
Use of the electronic detonator made it unnecessary to use the solenoid and lever assembly originally employed in the magnetic-influence portion of the fire control apparatus. Any loss of weight rendered by these changes underwent compensation with dummy weights added to the TEMs. The impact-inertia section was more sensitive as well, with an impact of only 28 oz. closing the inertia switch.
The magnetic-influence portions of these torpedo exploders were also different from the original Mark 6 TEM Mods. The magnetic devices passed current directly from the thyratron to the detonator, eliminating energizing of a solenoid from the circuit. This removed one variable of complexity and potential source of failure in the circuitry that, along with the all-electric fire control produced a vastly more reliable and effective torpedo.
The Mark 10 Mod 3 Torpedo Exploder Mechanism The story of the Mark 6 TEM does not end here, however. The Mark 10 TEM was designed to fit in the pocket of the Mark 6 on the Mark 14 Torpedo with minor modifications. Preliminary OP 1369 dated 13 March 1945 described the Mark 10 Mod 3 in great detail. Essentially, it is comprised of the many advances of the Mark 9 TEM described in my previous article (see Figure 4). It is designed to detect changes in the magnetic field in either polarity (with a .5 second delay to allow detonation under a vessel’s keel). Figure 4 shows the typical sequence for fire control of the exploder, while Figure 5 demonstrates the manner in which a magnetic-influence exploder mechanism performs once a ship’s magnetic signature (perturbation of the earth’s magnetic field) is detected. This leads to a depth increase so that when detonation occurs after a brief delay, it is at an ideal depth below a ship’s keel, the upward plume of the explosion breaking her back. Another problem inherent in the Mark VI TEM, that attendant to variations in the Earth’s magnetic field from the higher latitudes to the equator, was also solved.
The Mark 10 TEM also contains a contact-inertial component. Both the Mark 9 TEM and the Mark 10 TEM were supplied with extensive and unique testing equipment designed to assure that they were working properly before deployment. Thus, by the time even a preliminary OP was disseminated (with RESTRICTED, CLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, and SECRET components), a great deal of design, testing, and production work had already been done to assure that the device met the standards of the Bureau of Ordnance. Although the 50% effectiveness mentioned previously was necessary for further development (e.g., the Proximity Fuze), a much higher standard was necessary for production testing and deployment.
Ordnance meeting these standards developed during the war typically operated with reliability and efficiency in the high 90% range. (Army ordnance, such as artillery, bombs, and mortars employing the Proximity Fuze turned the tide of the Battle of the Bulge). The Mark 10 TEM was similar to the Mark 6 Mod 4 with significant modifications. A cap gun was added, as well as a mechanical gear for arming the influence feature of the exploder only after the torpedo had run for several hundred yards (this firing mechanism is described in detail in OP 663). Figure 4 shows how the magnetic-influence exploder was intended to operate under a target’s keel, reacting to changes in the magnetic signature expected given the nature of the earth’s magnetic field. This figure applies to all magnetic influence exploders in theory.
The Mark 9 Mod 3 TEM was designed for use with the Mark 16 Warhead. This was the Warhead used by the Mark 14 torpedo. 11 In the pre-war and early war period, this Mark 16-1 Warhead employed 507 pounds of TNT. Later on, it exploded with either 643 or 666 pounds of Torpex (Torpedo Exploder). 18 Torpex was a much more effective destructive force behind the phosphor bronze-covered (nonmagnetic) warhead.
We have seen that by the mid-1990s, a complete history of torpedo use and development during WWII could not have been written for public consumption. Many of the documents used to conduct the current research are in Record Group 74 boxes at the National Archives that were declassified in December, 1996 (this is marked clearly on the side of the respective RG 74 box from which the documents discussed here were obtained in 2009).
In The Submarine Review, a six part series on torpedo development from before, during, and after WWII was written by Professor F.J. Milford. Referring to the turning off of the Mark 6 Torpedo Explores Mechanism of the Mark 14 torpedo, he stated emphatically: “Magnetic influence exploders were not used by the U.S. Navy submarines through the balance of WWII.” In light of more recent data, this statement would require reconsideration.
Now we can see that the final story has not been written- not in 1996, 2006, and I doubt even 2010. A final exposition is probably not in the offing due to classification and declassification procedures. Dr. Baldwin’s account of the development of the Proximity Fuze and its application to Army Ordnance is instructive. The degree of separation of design and production contracts necessary in order to maintain secrecy and “need to know” dissemination of information was crucial during wartime, and maintained with utmost scrutiny. Even though the existence of the Proximity Fuze was known, the most revealing and technical exposition of its development was first made in 1947 in the American Journal of Physics.
One particularly revealing section of this paper notes that while quality control was usually handled by one of the military branches, in this case it was carried out by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHUAPL), and in the case of bomb and rocket fuzes, the National Bureau of Standards. Production testing was done at seven existing proving grounds, and seven additional proving grounds developed solely for the testing of the new fuze. I have heard the stories from my father of personal experiences during the testing of torpedo exploder mechanisms in the Pacific Northwest in the water- sometimes quite harrowing as when experimental torpedoes broached in the direction of the experimental personnel! One can but imagine the extent of secret testing of these new devices before they ended up in use by the Navy.
My father’s work under Section T at JHUAPL could only have occurred were it an absolute certainty that he could not and would not enter the armed forces, although he did try to obtain a commission.21 His colleague, Dr. James Van Allen, received a Lt. (jg) commission so that he could travel to the Pacific and “sell” the first anti-aircraft Proximity Fuze to line officers (by 1944; such a risk in the case of my father was not permitted). In one example of the production of safety devices for the Proximity Fuze (to protect military personnel), four out of five components were rejected. It is apparent now that some of the material that was once declassified in the National Archives and Records Administration Record Group 74 has been reclassified and therefore no longer accessible for public release or research. Much more is left to be understood, particularly how Navy and Army needs were met by scientists and engineers employed under the NDRC and OSRD. I believe we can say with some certainty that Magnetic-Influence Exploders, along with the Proximity Fuze and the Atomic Bomb, were among the most secret ordnance developments that allowed the Allies to defeat the Tripartite powers with dispatch, once the United States entered the conflict.
Admiral Hussey, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, was able to publicly praise the Proximity Fuze which was developed under his administration, as did Admiral Blandy and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal. They would probably have been pleased to mention publicly other Section T projects such as those described here, but could not. Although the existence of the Proximity Fuze had been made public, the extent of its decisive use in the European Theatre on the continent was not revealed until 1976. We may well yet discover other SECRET projects that brought this worldwide conflagration to a surprisingly rapid end.
Other aspects of torpedo development, such as underwater homing mechanisms developed at locations such as the Harvard Underwater Sound Laboratory (HUSL) were important. They are, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
A Final Note of Caution
I would like to quote from an October 17, 1945 Report (No. 1125) of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, in closing:
“This splendid agency [NDRC] but a few months hence will go out of existence. The contribution that it has made to the winning of the war is inestimable.
Without such contribution, it is safe to say that victory would await achievement. However the office has been essentially a war agency, and it is now engaged in liquidation. To its distinguished and internationally known head, Dr. Vannevar Bush, and the staff of great scientists he gathered around him to aid in the development of new weapons, the Nation owes much.”
Contrast this with the situation we have today in the United States. Is Nationhood a thing of the past? Many would argue yes, that these divisions are the de facto precursors to wars. However, there is insufficient space here to discuss foreign policy and global armament issues.
Yet, on the other hand, the former Axis powers, German, Italy, and Japan, are set to repeal post-war constitutional provisions in the Tripartite Pact that prevented preparations for offensive war and, in a sense, affect their sovereignty and national identity.25 In some cases these provisions may have already been violated technically if not in spirit. However, sentiment in these Nations and their former military adversaries has changed over the decades following V-E and V-J days. Where is the next Vannevar Bush, upon whom the United States will rely for a broad and deep comprehension of America’s technical and scientific capabilities not yet imagined? Someday, such a person will doubtless be needed. Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s choice of Dr. Bush was prescient, expedient, and in retrospect, virtually miraculous. The story of the Mark 14 torpedo is a small, but instructive chapter leading to my question. Vannevar Bush stated:
“Science, by itself, provides no panaceas for individual, social and economic life. It can be effective in the national welfare only as a member of a team, whether the conditions be peace or war. But without scientific progress, no amount of achievement in other directions can insure our health, prosperity and security as a nation in the modern world.”
It is fitting to ponder the low position of the 21stcentury United States in national comparisons of technical and science education and popular comprehension of these subjects. The 100-odd German scientists brought to the U.S. in Operation Paperclip following WWII have been estimated to be some ten to fifteen years ahead of the US in aerodynamics. They had created the first ballistic missile (V-2 or A-4). Dr. Robert Sauer’s 1943 book Theoretischc Einflihrung in die Gas dynamik was captured and translated into English for the military by Ralph A. Alpher and Freeman K. Hill.28 Professor Sauer’s work provided one of the foundations for the great strides taken at Pennemunde.
One of the rarefied pleasures of conducting an extensive research project of this nature is reflecting upon all of the people with whom one has had contact, and who provided encouragement, leads, information, warning of the dead ends and false leads, and adding a human dimension to the solitary esoteric work of research and writing. I am indebted most to my father, Dr. Ralph A. Alpher. He provided the inspiration for me to enter a career devoted to scholarship. The decision to enter into an intensive study of his career, which is part of the History of Science as well as the history of scientists’ involvement in protecting and defending the United States of America was inspired by many technical, scientific, and moral discussions we had over the course of many decades. Without handwritten notes he kept during the period 1940-45 (and beyond), I could not have embarked upon this investigation. Yet, as would be expected of anyone with a Q clearance, I had to be satisfied for much of my life with repeated vague statements about what my Dad did during the war, while my contemporaries told tales of their fathers slogging and freezing across Europe or sweating across the islands of the Pacific–or breathing in the dust of North Africa. And, of course, he could not serve because of his poor eyesight. This was his quick discussion-ending statement. His contributions were unique, sensitive, and irreplaceable. Draft boards and enlistment centers were provided a list of several thousand such persons who were not to be drafted or allowed to enlist.
I also acknowledge the contribution of his longtime colleague in Cosmology and Astrophysics, Dr. Robert C. Herman, who also worked on Section T contract, for his inspiration as I developed my career interests and philological nature. Bob recognized my passion of music as well- which we both shared and which he and his wife encouraged with a gift of a rare edition of “Old Irish Folk Music and Songs” by P.W. Joyce upon my college graduation.
Mr. Jack Lopez (USN-Retired), President of Aviation Archives, was my proxy at the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland. I was referred to him serendipitously; over time he has become an increasingly more important part of this project.
Friends, family, and colleagues are always important when one takes time away from day-to-day life to “do another dissertation.” They must accept that there is a moral imperative guiding such devotion to work of such devotion and drive. During the course of this period, l acknowledge the support, counsel, and consideration (in no order of importance) Jack Lopez, Lt. Col. C. Jay Lyons ( U.S.A.F.-Retired and his family), Dr. Dwight (Ed) Neuenschwander (Southern Nazarene University and American Institute of Physics), Dr. Barbara Goss Levy, Dr. Gerard J. Connors, Dr. Marcelo Gleiser (Dartmouth University), Matt Hickey (Workaholic Productions), Dr. Gary White (AIP), Dr. Igor Gamow, Dr. Bill Henry, Dr. Phil Kosky, Dr. Sandra Sessoms, Dr. and Mrs. Richard and Molly Schneider, Dr. and Mrs. James and Loys Marsden, Rich Pekelney (Historic Naval Ships Association), Captain C. Michael (Mickey) Garverick (USN-Retired), Dr. Ron Presswood, Paul Shomsky and The Military Rifle Journal, Janet Frostad and Renee Kurdzos (University of Puget Sound), Jane Doggett (Librarian, University of Washington Applied Physics Laboratory), FOIA Staff at NAVSEA, Reference Staff at the Defense Technical Information Center, Mary Jane Valachovic, Robert L. Bodin, Stacie Jo Carson, David Cave (University of Michigan), Tim Frank, M.A. (Historian-Consultant, Military Research Associates), Drs. Ralph Belknap Baldwin, James van Allen, Don White, Charlie Muckenfuss, Samuel Wait, Bob Johnson, and John C. Mather; Herr Udo Pfleghar, Herr Gottfried Leich, and Dipl. Arch. Wolfgang Graeser, and my longtime friend and cheerleader, Bill Erickson. Special thanks to Dr. Friedrich Dr. h.c. mult. Bauer. Responsibility for the ultimate content, interpretation and conclusions is of course attributable only to me.