Thank you for that introduction, and for the chance to speak to you today. As always, I should mention at the outset that these views are my own and not necessarily those of my employers.
A lot has changed over the last year, so there’s a lot to talk about. I want to begin with a few comments about the Columbia-class program, then move on to attack submarines, and then finish with a general com- ment.
Columbia class program
Schedule resiliency
Regarding the Columbia-class program, you may recall that when I was last here two years ago, I talked about the idea of generating some room inside the program’s development schedule, without changing the date for the boat’s first deterrent patrol, so that the program would have more ability to absorb shocks that might arise from time to time due to funding issues or technical problems. The submarine community has since announced that it is doing this, and it’s arguably not a moment too soon, because the program has already experienced one funding issue and one technical problem.
The funding issue, as you may recall, was a couple of years ago, when limits on DOE’s budget threatened to delay the procurement of high-speed computers needed for designing the boat’s nuclear fuel core in a timely manner. Left unaddressed, the Navy said at the time, that issue could have delayed the program’s development schedule by about six months.
The technical problem was the recently reported issue concerning the development of the motor for the boat’s electric drive system, which apparently didn’t impact the program’s overall development schedule, but serves as a reminder that there could be other technical issues over the next 14 years or so that might.
Those in the Columbia-class program office will recall that I had previously raised the issue of the technical risk involved in developing the boat’s electric drive system, and what this might mean in connec- tion with the boat’s tight overall development schedule. I raised it not only because this is a change from the mechanical-drive technology, but because of what happened with the development of the DDG-1000 inte- grated electric drive system.
As some of you might recall, the DDG-1000 program encountered a problem with its intended permanent magnet motor. As a result, the Navy decided to switch to its fallback option, which was the advanced induction motor. The technical goals of the Columbia-class program don’t allow for that kind of a fallback option. So the Columbia-class pro- gram doesn’t have an off ramp for this component in the same the way that the DDG-1000 program did.
Electric drive technology has matured further since the time of the DDG-1000 development effort, in part because of the lessons learned with the DDG-1000 system. But what happened with the Columbia-class motor is nevertheless a reminder of the risks involved, and of how those risks might be addressed in part by generating resiliency within the Co- lumbia-class development schedule for absorbing shocks.
In responding to reports about the Columbia-class motor problem and the issue of the program’s technical risk and tight schedule gener- ally, one option for the submarine community would be to explain in greater detail what the Navy is doing to generate resiliency within the Columbia-class program schedule, and provide periodic updates on the progress of that effort.
Another would be to note a point I heard someone make a while back, in a briefing I got from the Navy. It wasn’t a briefing on the Co- lumbia-class program, which is part of the reason I’m mentioning it here. This person acknowledged that there is some risk in developing the elec- tric drive system. But he also noted that there would be technical risk in trying to develop a mechanical drive system that could meet the perfor- mance requirements for the Columbia class, particularly when you con-sider that the submarine community has already spent decades perfecting mechanical drive technology, making further progress harder to achieve. That’s a point that might help others put into perspective the recent issue with the Columbia-class motor and any future issues that might arise in the development of the boat’s electric drive system.
National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund
The other item I want to talk about regarding the Columbia-class program is the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund. Arguments about the fund continue to come up from time to time.
Critics of the fund have argued, first, that the fund is a basically budget gimmick—an example of budgetary smoke and mirrors. Second, they have argued that the special procurement authorities that have been added to the law governing the fund, for the purpose of reducing the cost of Columbia-class boats and other nuclear-powered vessels, could be enacted separately, through other legislation.
Supporters of the fund could argue that since it is intended to encour- age policymakers to look at the Columbia-class program as something to be funded from resources from across DOD, and not just from the Navy’s budget, it amounts to a policy statement from the Congress—a statement about how Congress would prefer the funding for this program to be resourced. As a policy statement, they could argue, it is similar to other congressional policy statements and sense-of-the-Congress statements that are from time to time incorporated into defense- and security-related legislation, including NDAAs. Supporters could argue that if the law governing the fund were to be repealed, there would be no guarantee, in a different legislative context, that the special procurement authorities would once again be approved by Congress in a timely manner. The issue of legislative context, supporters could argue, is sometimes why provisions are put into certain bills and not others.
Attack submarines
355-ship plan and mid-march budget outline
As everyone here is well aware, the Navy’s new 355-ship force-level objective, which was released in December, includes a force-level goal of 66 attack boats. This has led to a lot of discussion about just how quickly the attack boat procurement rate can be increased, and to what level. It’s helpful to understand the particulars of that issue.
And it turns out that the force can reach 66 boats by the mid- to late- 2030s, if all the 1s in the Virginia-class procurement profile are changed into 2s, so that the profile shows 2+1 Virginia and Columbia class pro- curement in the 12 Columbia-class procurement years, while perhaps also procuring 3 Virginias per year in some non-Columbia years.
In mid-March, however, the administration released a federal budget outline that put a damper on the idea of building up the size of the mil- itary. The DOD funding level in that budget outline was judged by ob- servers to be consistent with fully funding the Obama administration de- fense program of record, and with funding some readiness fixes beyond that, but not much more than that. The funding level was not deemed consistent with the idea of building up the size of the military along the lines of what the Trump campaign organization had talked about, which included a 350-ship Navy. As a result of that budget outline, a lot of observers are now reassessing whether the military buildup will be real- ized, or even attempted.
If the Navy budget top line winds up getting even a relatively small boost beyond what would be needed to fully fund the Navy’s FY17 pro- gram of record and fix Navy readiness problems, then attack submarine procurement could be a candidate to receive some of that remaining ad- ditional funding, for reasons that I have discussed in my previous talks here.
And even with the constraints on defense spending that have existed for several years now, Congress has sometimes added funding for ship- building above the requested level. In the FY17 budget that Congress finalized a few days ago, for example, Congress increased funding for shipbuilding above the administration’s request by $2.8 billion, which was enough additional funding to pay for, among other things, an addi- tional LPD-17, an additional LCS, and the remaining 30% or so of an additional DDG-51 that had been partially funded in FY16. There were also smaller amounts of additional funding for some other programs, including $85 million in additional advance procurement funding for the Virginia-class program. The total increase of $2.8 billion, it can be not- ed, happens to be about what you would need to fully fund an additional Virginia-class boat.
Given that, there’s some reason for observers to perhaps think that some additional Virginia-class boats might be added to the shipbuilding plan in coming years, even if DOD budget increases are not large enough to pay for a general military buildup. But the goal, of turning all the 1s in the Virginia-class procurement profile into 2s, and that submarine procurement will move up to a steady rate of 2+1 and 3+0, is another question.
It’s possible that the fully detailed FY18 budget request, which will be submitted in a couple of weeks, might move the DOD top line up to the levels needed to start a military buildup, including a fleet of 355 ships, making 2+1 and 3+0 more possible. But if the top line in that budget is closer to where it was in the mid-March budget outline, then that would suggest a potentially much more modest situation in terms of potential attack boat procurement increases.
If that’s the case, then the date for getting to 66 will be pushed from the mid- to late-2030s to something even farther into the future, effec- tively bringing to mind that famous cartoon from the New Yorker.1
More to the point, if the increase in Virginia-class procurement is going to be relatively modest, then the projected valley in the attack boat force level from the mid-20s to the mid-30s will not be mitigated very much.
As you know, I’ve been testifying, reporting, and speaking about that valley since 1995. So this is my 23rd year of doing that.
For the last several years, I’ve argued that this valley might weaken, for a period of some years, conventional deterrence against a potential adversary like China. And if that’s the case, it doesn’t help that the valley will overlap with what some observers have characterized as a decade of concern regarding the potential for aggressive military moves by China.
When I first brought up the idea years ago that the valley might lead to a weakening of deterrence for some number of years, I didn’t get much reaction from the submarine community. But in more recent years, my comments about this seem to have resonated more. I take that as one indication among many of how China has grown over the last several years as a planning concern for the Navy and DOD in general.
But more to the point, it is now apparent that China itself has taken note of the valley. Last September, I was at an unclassified roundtable discussion on China’s navy that was held at CNAS—the Center for a New American Security—at the CNAS office in downtown Washington.
Among the presenters at that discussion was one of the analysts at the Naval War College who track developments in China’s navy. And when he discussed developments in China’s undersea warfare capabili- ties, he put up a slide showing an excerpt from the November 2014 edi- tion of a military journal from China, highlighting a passage from one of its articles. That passage was translated on the slide as follows:
“… in 2028, the [USN] force of nuclear attack submarines will fall from the current number of 55 down to 41 boats. Some are con- cerned about whether this force level can meet the requirements of the Asia-Pacific rebalance.”2
Some options
If that is the general situation that might come to pass—a possibility for perhaps a few additional Virginia-class boats, but perhaps not much more than that, a competitor who has taken notice of the projected val- ley in the attack boat force level, and U.S. observers who are indeed concerned about potential military moves by China during those years— then what are some potential options for the submarine community for addressing that situation?
Here are some options. This is by no means a complete set of op- tions, just some items that might be included in a list of options.
One of these relates to the current uncertainty over the future U.S. role in the world. There is arguably more uncertainty over this right now than there has been since before World War II. To have an adult memory of the last time there was as much uncertainty over the future U.S. role in the world than there is right now, you arguably would need to be about 95 years old, or more.
In the presence of this uncertainty, one option for the submarine community would be to argue that control of the undersea domain, and using that control to leverage the world’s oceans, could be crucial to im- plementing a wide range of possible future U.S. roles in the world. The argument, in other words, would be that as a consequence of world geog- raphy, leveraging the world’s oceans could be a fundamental element of strategy for the United States, and controlling the undersea environment would be fundamental to that.
Another option would be to argue that the submarine community has saved a lot of money and improved its cost effectiveness over the years through things like the 2-for-4-in-12 cost-reduction effort, the 3:15 life cycle effort, and the use of multiyear contracting. As part of that, one option would be to have handy the total estimated amount of money that has been saved in submarine procurement over the years through multi- year contracting.
And similarly, an associated option would be to argue that the sub- marine community could save a lot of money in the future through con- tinued use of multiyear procurement, use of the special procurement authorities in the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, and any higher annual procurement rates that occur.
All of these options could form part of a case for having the sub- marine community receive a share of any funding that might become available that is above the amount needed to fully fund the Navy’s FY17 program of record and fix Navy readiness problems. As I have noted in the past, making a case applies to all parts of the Navy, and all the mili- tary services, so that policymakers have the best arguments available to support their decisions.
If it turns out that only modest amounts of additional funding be- come available to the submarine community, then one option would be to use it for things like restoring ARCI updates, buying new towed ar- rays, and doing other things that can help maximize the effectiveness of the boats that you will have.
Another option, particularly if there is a chance that the amount of additional funding for submarines might be something more than that, would be to avoid making the mistake that the Navy made in 2007, when it told Congress, incorrectly, that you can’t fund the procurement of an attack boat without first providing one or two years of advance procure- ment funding. That’s not true. Congress can point-blank fully fund the procurement of an attack boat—or any other kind of nuclear-powered ship—if it wants to, without having provided any advance procurement funding in prior years, for two reasons. First, Congress has the constitu- tional authority to do so. And second, doing this doesn’t create a problem in building the boat, as long as people realize that the interval between the nominal year of full funding and the year the boat enters service will be longer than normal. Congress in the past has fully funded nucle- ar-powered ships that could not be executed right away, and it could do so again.
The Navy’s incorrect testimony in 2007 might not have cost the Navy one or more additional attack boats back then, but repeating that mistake this time around, in a possible context of an opportunity for getting one or two additional boats funded, just might. Years from now, when the attack boat force is at the bottom of the valley, having one or two additional boats might be helpful.
Another option would be to make sure that the submarine commu- nity understands, in the context of a more-constrained force structure and procurement scenario, what the potential quantity and capability tradeoffs are between building Virginia-class boats with or without the VPM. In other words, would building a few Virginia-class boats without VPM free up enough marginal funding to help facilitate, in conjunction with some funding from some other source, the building of an additional Virginia-class boat? And if so, how would having that additional boat compare to having a slightly larger number of VPMs? I’m not saying whether this tradeoff would make sense. I’m saying the submarine com- munity might want to understand whether or not this would make sense.
Another option, which I’ve mentioned before, would be to take steps to maximize the number of operational boats during the bottom years of the valley—such as moving maintenance actions, if possible, to years before or after the bottom part of the valley—and then advertising these steps to potential adversaries.
Along the same lines, another option would be to take one addition- al look at whether, among the youngest of the 688s, there are a scant few—like maybe up to five—that could be extended for a small number of years, so that they could continue operating across the lowest part of the valley. As of a few months ago, at least, the Navy was operating three Los Angeles-class boats—the 698, 699, and 700—at age 36, which is 3 years beyond the class nominal service life, and one of these, the 698, was scheduled to go for another year or so, until age 37.3 If some of the youngest 688s could be operated to age 36 or 37, perhaps in part by hus- banding their neutrons between now and then, it could help fill in some of the bottom years of the valley.
A more radical version of this option, if the neutrons won’t be there, would be to give a few of the youngest 688s an additional refueling for the purpose of operating them for just a few more years. I don’t know whether that would be technically feasible, and even if it were, it would be a very expensive option in term of dollars spent for each of those few additional years of operation. And it would take those boats out of operation for the time needed to refuel them. On the other hand, it might help prevent a failure of deterrence during the valley that could lead to a vastly more expensive war.
Any 688s who lives were extended, of course, would be less capa- ble than Virginia-class boats, but that doesn’t mean they wouldn’t be of some value, particularly since the Navy currently intends to operate 688s out to the year 2029, which is the year the force reaches the bottom of the valley.
Another option, which I’ve also mentioned before, would be to en- courage the Japanese, as part of their defense review, to increase the planned size of their conventional attack boat force from 22 to 30, which they could do by keeping their boats in service for 30 years instead of 22, without increasing their one-boat-per-year procurement rate. The additional boats, being non-nuclear powered, could not replace SSNs, but they could perform certain missions, and this is the closest thing to a free lunch that I’ve been able to identify in the world of U.S. and allied submarine force structure.
One final option would be to work to create some surprises for China that could throw them off balance in terms of their assessment of what the situation will look like during the valley years. That could include things like developing a new weapon in the black world and then an- nouncing it before the bottom of the valley, but too late for China to do much about it—perhaps something like that 100-mile or more torpedo with associated command and control that Vice Admiral Connor testi- fied about two years ago,4 or one or two suddenly revealed squadrons of armed versions of the Extra Large UUV.
As a final comment about all these options, it should be noted that although I have pinned them to the specific scenario of helping to pre- vent a failure of deterrence during the valley, several of them could be considered for the attack boat force for more general reasons.
China
I want to finish with a general comment about China. It’s not that I’m not concerned about Russia, or about the situation in the Middle East. I am. But for length purposes, I had to leave some things in my talk today on the cutting room floor, and while Russia or the Middle East are concerns that can be discussed during the Q&A, China is a kind of competitor the United States hasn’t faced before, and one that the United States seems to be having some difficulty figuring out how to address.
China appears to have identified a set of goals for what it wants to accomplish in its home region and beyond, and appears to have put together an overall strategy for achieving those goals. That strategy in- cludes a lot of elements other than their military, but their military mod- ernization effort is part of it, and improvements in their submarine force and undersea warfare capability are a part of that.
China’s rate of submarine commissioning in recent years hasn’t been
as high as some observers might have projected. On the other hand, Chi- na reportedly is now finishing work on a new nuclear submarine con- struction facility that will be the world’s largest. Reportedly, this facility includes a 430,000-squarefoot assembly hall with two parallel produc- tion lines, and is large enough to build four SSNs simultaneously.5 You might have talked about this facility in one of your sessions at this con- ference. And this facility will be on top of China’s ongoing production elsewhere of non-nuclear-powered boats. What is going to happen to China’s submarine force after this new nuclear submarine facility goes into production, which reportedly will happen later this year?6
Stepping back from China’s submarine force, and from its military, I would like to focus for a moment on our general competitive situation with China. China, as I said, appears to have a set of goals, and a strategy for achieving them. It also has resources to apply to that strategy, and is doing so with a wholeof-government approach and a persistence that reflects a long-term perspective.
By contrast, the United States in my view currently has no clear, consensus concept of its goals and strategy for Eurasia, or within that, its goals or strategy for East Asia, or within that, its goals or strategy for China. The United States has enormous resources it could apply to a strategy, but how the country will choose to apply its resources to such a strategy relative to other domestic and foreign spending priorities is not yet clear. U.S. observers and practitioners constantly aspire to a whole-of-government approach, but most of the time there is at best in- consistent evidence of such an approach being pursued in a consistent manner. The focus often appears to be on the short term rather than the long term, and there are competing demands on our leaders’ time and attention in the Middle East and Europe, which are regions that tend to get more continuous and voluminous press coverage in the United States than do events in East Asia.
A country that has fewer overall resources, but which has a strategy, can compete successfully against a country or countries that have greater resources, but which do not have a clearly identified, consensus strate- gy. Or, if you want to boil it down to a few words: strategy can beat no strategy.
For the 20 years or so of the post-Cold War era, when the United States was the unipolar power, the U.S. was in a situation where it could have high confidence of being able to accomplish its goals simply by an- nouncing and taking some actions, without embedding those actions in a larger, coherent strategy. That ad hoc, nonstrategic approach to manag- ing the world’s affairs was a luxury the United States could afford during the post-Cold War era.
But the post-Cold War era has ended. In retrospect, it can now be seen that it started eroding around 2008. It was pretty much gone by 2014. The country is now in a new era, an era of renewed major power competition, and the question is whether the country can remember how to operate in that kind of a situation, after 20 years or so of not having been required to. And that, I would argue, starts with forming a clear, consensus strategy.
I’m not saying what that strategy should be—observers have various views on that. I’m saying it will be preferable to have a strategy than to not have one. If the country doesn’t put one together—if it continues to muddle along without one—what will that mean for the U.S. position in the world over the long run, in an era of renewed great power com- petition where at least one other major power has such a strategy and is working to implement it? And for our purposes here today, the question becomes, what might that in turn mean for the submarine force?
One option for the submarine community would be to help nudge the national security leadership one or two levels up to work on devising a clearly defined approach to the U.S. role in the world, with a clearly defined grand strategy behind it. And while the submarine community is doing that, it could manage the current situation of strategic non-consen- sus by considering options such as those I outlined earlier.
Conclusion
Thank you for taking the time to listen. I hope you found some of the options, and the analysis that led to them, of value. As always, I’m happy to respond to any questions you might have.
ENDNOTES
1. The Bob Mankoff cartoon from 1993 that is discussed here: “The Story of “How About Never,” New Yorker, March 27, 2014, posted at: http://www.newyorker.com/ cartoons/bob-mankoff/the-story-of-how-about-never .
2. Lyle Goldstein, “Evolution of Chinese Power Projection Capabilities,” presentation to CNAS roundtable discussion, September 29, 2016, slide 7 of 41.
3. The Navy’s FY2017 30-year shipbuilding plan shows the 698, which entered service in March 1981, as scheduled for deactivation in FY2019.
4. Testimony of Vice Admiral (retired) Michael J. Connor before the United States House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, Sea Power and Projection Forc- es Committee, Hearing [on] Game Changers—Undersea Warfare, October 27, 2015,
p. 2. See also Megan Eckstein, “COMSUBFOR Connor: Submarine Force Could Be- come the New A2/AD Threat,” USNI News, May 14, 2015; and Christopher P. Cavas, “Seeking Game Changers in the Underwater World,” Defense News, November 27, 2015.
5. See Jeffrey Lin and P. W. Singer, “China Is Building the World’s Largest Nuclear Submarine Facility,” Popular Science, May 1, 2017.
6. Ibid.
