In the late 1980s, the Canadian navy became embroiled in a controver- sial effort to acquire nuclear submarines. When it ultimately failed, the severe political and public fallout derailed the navy’s original program to acquire replacement conventional boats for its 30-year-old Oberon-class conventional submarines. Seeking a way to resurrect its conventional program, and attempting to do so in the new and unfamiliar strategic environment that accompanied the end of the Cold War, naval planners thought they could derive positive publicity for submarines by supporting so called ‘national missions’ in aid of other government de- partments, something they had only rarely done during the Cold War. In October 1993, naval headquarters informed Atlantic command (MAR- LANT) that they “would like to raise the profile of our submarines in the public eye if possible to set the scene for future posturing on the sub- marine replacement issue.” To accomplish this, they have suggested the following activities, some of which our submarines have been involved
in the past:
A. Counter Drug Operations including exercises with the RCMP;
B. Fisheries patrols with Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) personnel embarked;
C. Embarkation of an RCMP SERT Team and exercise boarding ships and/or scaling [oil] rigs;
D. Adriatic Deployment.
An Oberon never made it to the Adriatic to join NATO’s Operation SHARP GUARD, but they did provide invaluable surveillance support to the RCMP on a number of counter drug operations. However, the highest profile national missions were fisheries patrols carried out by Ojibwa on the Georges Bank in March 1993 and by Okanagan off the Grand Banks in the autumn of 1994. ‘Fishpats’ were ‘odd jobs’ for Cana- dian submarines, and this study will detail the two operations to explore the viability of using submarines in such a role.
Sea-going poachers of any nationality are crafty adversaries, and that trait was fully alive on Georges Bank south of Nova Scotia in the early 1990s. Historically, Georges Bank had been a vibrant fishery consisting largely of ground fish and scallops but stocks began to decline rapidly in the 1960s when European fishing fleets moved from the increasingly bare shelves of the Northwest Atlantic into the bountiful Gulf of Maine. The situation stabilized after Canada and the United States established 200-mile exclusive fishing zones in 1977, but the two countries disputed ownership of Georges Bank. They submitted the case to the World Court, which in 1984 established the ‘Hague Line’ to delineate the maritime boundary. Over the next few years, scallop beds on the American side declined when some 300 fishing vessels registered to fish the area; in contrast, scallop stocks remained abundant on the Canadian side where annual permits were given to just 35 boats. Not surprisingly, the Canadi- an side of the line became a lucrative area for American fishermen who, of course, had previously considered it their own. According to a DFO study:
The scallop poacher penetrates into Canadian water under cov- er of night or fog. For the night or while the fog lasts his swath of dragging increases further and deeper with each new pass until he has taken all he can. He takes a more mature, larger and therefore more valuable Canadian scallop. Not only is he poaching; he is also over-fishing the area….They take approximately 5,000 lbs of scallop every night they are on the Banks. They return to the US side of the Hague Line before sunrise to process the catch during the day. Then they repeat the procedure again the next evening and so on until they have a full processed load. In a few days they have a catch worth a hundred thousand dollars on the US market at New Bedford.
To deter this activity, in the summer of 1992 DFO approached the navy about using submarines to enhance its surveillance and enforce- ment capability. Naval planners recognized this would not only provide a valuable national service but could raise the profile of submarines, and in March 1993 HMCS Ojibwa was made available.
This was not the first time that MARCOM had utilized a subma- rine for a fisheries patrol. In March 1975 Okanagan deployed to the Nose and Tail of the Grand Banks with three destroyers and maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) to trial procedures as to how mixed forces might detect and apprehend fisheries violators. Under the plan concocted, Okanagan would conduct covert surveillance of fishing areas, and if she detected illegal activity, would vector the destroyers waiting over the horizon to arrest the violator. As it was, this novel concept was never tested as bad weather forced cancellation of the operation, which, it appears, was nev- er remounted.
OP AMBUSCADE had three objectives:
Primary. To detect, track, positively identify and initiate apprehen- sion of fisheries violators; specifically, US scallop draggers operating in Canadian waters;
Secondary. To produce photographic, acoustic and electronic evi- dence in support of DFO and DND objectives; and
Tertiary. To conduct general surveillance of the assigned patrol area. Ojibwa was the only warship involved, but she was supported by Canadian Forces Aurora and Sea King aircraft, DFO aircraft and patrol vessels, as well as by US Coast Guard (USCG) assets. DFO was the lead agency for AMBUSACADE, but CDR R.E. Bush, the Submarine Oper- ating Authority at MARLANT, controlled Ojibwa’s movements. Impor- tantly, a DFO Fisheries Officer embarked in Ojibwa to provide technical information about fishing practices, and, if a violator was caught, to en-
sure proper evidence was gathered to ensure a conviction.
To obtain sufficient evidence, ROEs established that Ojibwa had to detect intruders that had fished more than a nautical mile over the Hague Line; fix their position with sufficient accuracy to prove the incursion; identify the vessels; and observe them deploying or recovering their fish-ing gear. Ojibwa’s CO, LCDR Dean Marsaw was given several options to confirm the identity of contacts: he could track and observe covertly, and then call in DFO air and sea assets to track and board violators; he could track and observe, then pass the information to DFO to arrange interception by the US Coast Guard; or he could surface Ojibwa and identify the violator, although planners recognized this could prove risky if the violator reacted aggressively. No matter what option was utilized, Ojibwa had to maintain continuous contact with the violator.
AMBUSCADE opened at 0010Z 7 March 1993. Proceeding submerged about six miles northeast of the Hague Line, Ojibwa initially detected a Canadian fishing vessel. Marsaw chose to break his ops team “gently” into working in close proximity to such targets with instructions to approach no closer than 4000 yards during darkness, and to open the range when snorting. At daylight Marsaw realized that “closing for iden- tification was easy and I found that a range of 1000 yards was adequate for identification.” One problem, however, “is that in the vicinity of fish- ing vessels, the high concentration of seagulls could be a counter-detec- tion risk. The seagulls are attracted to the periscope and wheel about it vigorously.”
Now relatively comfortable in the environment, Marsaw closed the Hague Line. At 1635Z Ojibwa detected an American dragger, des- ignated contact ‘M02’, fishing two miles inside the US side of the line. Marsaw approached to within 900 yards to ascertain its identity, and then withdrew to the line. Ojibwa maintained position at about 4000 yards, moving at about 4 knots at a depth of 52 feet. Plotting established that the vessel was trawling on an east-west line stopping just short of the Hague Line, but at 2330Z, in expectation of a transgression, Ojib- wa’s ops team “stood watch for apprehension of Fishing violator.” Sure enough, after night fell the dragger closed the line and at 0013Z 8 March, the OOW noted in his log that “M02 has altered course, believe he is closing the Canadian side. Good night clear, stars out, well lit by moon. Sea state is such as to cover periscope exposure while allowing good depth keeping.” Minutes later the American vessel switched off its navigation lights, maintaining only a working light on its fantail. At 0028Z Ojibwa fixed it on the Canadian side of the line, and Marsaw “took every SATNAV fix available and then took a visual bearing and radar range” to track its position. They eventually plotted it 1000 yards across the line and Ojibwa’s sonar operators heard it winching in its rake, confirmed by periscope, providing clear evidence of a violation. “Unfortunately,” Marsaw wrote in his report, “it appears that at that instant he was less than 1nm inside the Canadian area,” therefore outside the enforcement parameters set by the ROEs.
Despite the fact the boat never penetrated a full nautical mile inside Canadian territory, the Fisheries Officer onboard Ojibwa was nonethe- less tempted to call in the DFO helicopter to make an arrest. It proved fortunate he exercised caution since it soon became apparent that Ojib-wa’s navigation had been flawed. Summarizing that night’s watch in the patrol narrative the OOW observed:
Although it seemed M02 was violating the Hague Line, due to poor fixing and a significant tidal stream, OJIBWA was not where she thought she was. When a sat fix finally did come in, OJIBWA and [M02] were both in American water. His navigation is apparently superior to our own. Judging by how often and how close he skirts the Hague Line I would say he knows exactly where he is.
Thus, if the vessel had been apprehended and the case taken to court, Ojibwa’s errors in navigation would have fouled prosecution; any posi- tive publicity garnered from the event would have evaporated in the face of acute embarrassment.
Marsaw noted a number of problems responsible for the naviga- tion challenges. Experience demonstrated the tidal set “often exceeded” that predicted in the tidal atlas available in the boat. Loran C “was vir- tually useless as even occasional mast washover caused chain slippage.” SATNAV was the “only navigation aid fitted that would have the contin- ued accuracy needed….The great disadvantage of this method was that a convenient satellite was not always available and only through good luck would one be available coincident with the easternmost progress of the target.” Something beyond luck was needed, and Marsaw concluded that “GPS fitted to a workable mast would have been invaluable for an oper- ation of this nature.” However, GPS units were then a scarce commodity in the Canadian navy and submarines were well down the priority list.
Ojibwa tracked a variety of contacts over the next 48 hours but was frustrated by additional navigation challenges, equipment breakdowns and the erratic behaviour of fishing vessels. Nonetheless, on 9/10 March Ojibwa tracked three American vessels, including one the DFO officer recognized as a repeat violator but it only penetrated 500 yards onto the Canadian side. With AMBUSCADE nearing conclusion, discussion centred on how to achieve the deterrence aspect of the mission. Marsaw recommended that if Ojibwa was “unable to firmly establish a violator’s pos[itio]n in excess of 1NM inside CAN water PR opportunity should exist to surface near someone who is crowding the line.” Headquarters disagreed, concerned that if Ojibwa surfaced close to a fishing boat, even if just for photographic purposes, the poacher might get spooked and en- danger the submarine. Late on 10 March, CDR Bush informed Marsaw that a group of Canadian fishing vessels were working in the area and “[we] prefer that you use one of these vessels for overt PR photos rather than surprise someone.”
An image of Ojibwa surfacing alongside a fishing vessel—even if Canadian—would reveal a submarine was patrolling Georges Bank, but, ultimately, more dramatic action was taken. After tracking two American vessels for a few hours, the fishing officer raised them on VHF from the submerged submarine. According to Marsaw’s report, the officer “con- tacted the captains of both vessels by radio and identified himself as a Fishery Officer on board the Canadian submarine Ojibwa. He advised the captains their vessels’ movements had been tracked over the past few days and he advised the captains if they strayed across into Canadian waters again they would be charged.” Minutes later an Aurora punctuat- ed Ojibwa’s warning by overflying the two vessels at low altitude. The fishermen were stunned, and their emotionally charged response remains legendary in MARLANT to this day. Personnel in Halifax monitoring the comms network overheard the Americans spreading the warning that a submarine was on Georges Bank, and one fisherman even radioed Ojibwa that it was not just he who was guilty of crossing the line. Later, the New Bedford Standard Times newspaper contacted DFO, who gladly expanded upon Ojibwa’s role. Canadian media also picked up the story. AMBUSCADE thus became common knowledge and, for a time at least, American fishermen had to assume that a Canadian submarine might be covertly observing activities along the Hague Line.
AMBUSCADE demonstrated a submarine could locate, track, identify and monitor the activity of scallop draggers, and do so covertly. Moreover, she could not only obtain and record acoustic signatures of fishing vessels, but could tie them to a specific identity, confirmed vi- sually by periscope. This helped to build a contact index similar to that for submarines so that individual fishing vessels could be identified by their unique acoustic signatures. The operation also provided valuable experience for ops teams, especially in building plots in a high density traffic area, a rare opportunity in Canadian waters. AMBUSCADE pro- vided other useful lessons, especially the requirement for precise nav- igation, and although Ojibwa’s SATNAV and LORAN C systems had proved inadequate, a panacea was on the horizon in GPS. In terms of deterrence, there was a short term pay-off since violations of the Hague Line decreased from 33 in 1993 to just one in 1995, but AMBUSCADE proved a one-off and, inevitably, violations rose again. Nonetheless, de- spite significant training, operational and maintenance demands upon its three boats, the navy retained a willingness to devote precious submarine services to such national missions, and as Part 2 describes, within a year an Oberon embarked upon another fishpat.
