Introduction
Thank you for the kind introduction. As always, I should state at the outset that these views are my own and not necessarily those of my employer.
It’s an honor to once again have a chance to speak to you at this event, particularly given the challenging international security environ- ment and the prospect of an expanded shipbuilding effort for achieving a larger Navy, including a larger submarine force.
My talk to you today has three parts. The first two parts are longer, and the third and final part is fairly brief.
Current context
In the first part, I want to outline some factors that help form the
current context for discussing submarine programs.
One of those factors is the outlook for defense spending. The most recent budget agreement increased the defense spending caps for FY18 and FY19, permitting additional spending on various things, including shipbuilding.
The outlook for defense spending after FY19 is less clear. Some ob- servers are of the view that the outcome of the mid-term elections in November, combined with concerns for the increased deficit and debt projections following enactment of the recent tax bill, could slow or halt the growth in the defense topline. Not everyone agrees with that predic- tion, but it’s a possibility, and if it were to come to pass, FY19 could turn out to be a high point for defense spending, for a while at least, making it possibly the last chance for gas, so to speak, for certain efforts that could be funded under a higher defense top line, but perhaps not under a more-constrained one.
A second factor shaping the current context is strong bipartisan sup- port for Navy shipbuilding. That’s been true for a long time, but it has been particularly evident during the years of the Budget Control Act, during which shipbuilding has actually been plussed up by Congress year after year, notwithstanding the caps on base-budget defense spending.
That support is due to a number of factors, including not just the jobs generated by shipbuilding, but also the increased defense planning emphasis on the Western Pacific, which for the United States is primarily a naval and aerospace theater, and the improvement in the execution of Navy shipbuilding programs that took place during the nine years that Sean Stackley served as the Navy’s acquisition executive, which made it easier for policymakers to support proposals for increased shipbuilding. Within that strong support for Navy shipbuilding, a third factor that helps to form the current context is especially strong support for subma- rine construction. Attack submarines are viewed as particularly respon- sive to the A2/AD challenges being mounted by China and other coun- tries, and the Virginia-class program’s record in delivering boats largely on time or ahead of schedule, even while reducing planned construction times and improving capabilities, again makes it easier for policymakers
to support the program and consider higher procurement rates.
A fourth factor shaping the current context is the valley or trough in SSN force levels projected for the 2020s and 2030s, which I’ve been talking, reporting, and testifying about since 1995. Over the last couple of years, policymakers have begun to focus more on this issue. It’s now late in the game to do something about it—the options for addressing it are now narrower than they were years ago. But there are a still a couple of options that could be pursued, which I’ll get to in a moment.
And a fifth factor shaping the current context for discussing subma- rine programs is the shift in the international security environment from the more benign post-Cold War era, also known as the unipolar moment, to a new era of renewed major power competition.
The December National Security Strategy and the January unclas- sified summary of the new National Defense Strategy put the return of great power competition front and center, and formally shifted U.S. na- tional security strategy and national defense strategy from the previous 4+1 construct—where Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, plus the challenge of international terrorism, were all given some degree of prom- inence—to the new 2+3 construct, where China and Russia are clearly in the forefront, as the 2, and the other three concerns, though still import-ant, are now in the next tier.
Within the submarine community, when it comes to Russia and Chi- na, there is often a focus on Russia, because Russia is the submarine technological pacing threat. But I want to focus for a minute on China, because even though China isn’t the technological pacing threat on sub- marines, the totality of China’s actions in the long run may have at least as much importance for the U.S. submarine community, if not more, than Russia’s.
Last year I mentioned a new shipyard that China was building—a shipyard that some observers had concluded was intended for building nuclear-powered submarines—and I expressed concern about what that was going to mean for China’s future nuclear-powered submarine force levels. Not too long after that, other observers concluded, based on the characteristics of this new shipyard, that the facility would be used for building commercial ships rather than submarines. So, other things held equal, that would be cause for breathing a little easier, at least for the time being.
But other things have not held equal. China’s statements and actions over the last year have made it clear that China has ambitious goals for advancing its interests and values not only in its home region, but across Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific region, and elsewhere around the world, and that China has an integrated, whole-of-society strategy for achieving those goals. As others have remarked, China is playing a long game. China is implementing its comprehensive strategy with deep pockets, persistence, patience, tactical flexibility, limited concern for rules and norms that it finds inconvenient, and an understanding of how to boil the American frog.
In this sense, China is unlike any challenge the United States has ever faced, and over the last year, there has been rapidly growing aware- ness of this. But even so, my sense is that there remains a lag in recogniz- ing and internalizing the full scope and scale of China’s challenge to the
U.S. position in the world, to the U.S.-led international order, and to U.S. values. In short, even though China is part of the 2 in the 2+3 construct, it’s not clear to me that there is a full understanding and appreciation, when it comes to China, of just what’s hitting us.
To the extent that there are efforts to fully apprehend, absorb and act on China’s challenge, we’re also subject to having our attention frequent- ly drawn to other concerns, such as Europe and Russia, or the Middle East, or North Korea. And even though the unipolar moment ended years ago, there still seems to be a struggle to break free of an attitude that appears to have developed during the quarter-century or so of the post- Cold War era that the U.S. place of leadership in the world is somehow automatic or preordained, and that the United States doesn’t have to put more than a certain amount of effort into defending it.
So what does all that have do to with this submarine force?
Well, from time to time, you see calls for a whole-of-government
U.S. strategy or a U.S. interagency effort to counter China. The summary of the new National Defense Strategy mentions the interagency process several times. But slowness in recognizing the breadth and resourcing of China’s challenge, as well security challenges in other parts of the world and a lack of recent experience in devoting more than a certain amount of time, attention, and resources to defending the U.S. position in the world could combine to make it difficult to devise a U.S. whole-of-government strategy for countering China, to resource it adequately, and to stick with it over time.
If the United States were to fall short of that, then the U.S. effort, instead of consisting of a sustained and well-resourced balance of dip- lomatic, information, economic, and military dimensions, might instead come to lean more heavily on the military dimension. And within that military dimension, as China continues to field improving A2/AD ca- pabilities, and develops key emerging military-applicable technologies such as quantum technology, artificial intelligence, and hypersonics, it is the crown jewels of U.S. military capability that may take on more importance as bastions of remaining U.S. military superiority.
And now I think you can see where this is going—because subma- rines and undersea warfare are not only one of those U.S. crown jew- els, but one that is resistant to being overcome quickly, because it is a product of technologies, design knowhow, environmental measurements, tactical development, and operational experience amassed over a span of decades, and is therefore something not easily replicated or undermined by a single technological counterstroke.
I’m not saying that when it comes to competing with China, it’s all going to come down to submarines. But I am saying that in a long- term competition against China, submarines and undersea warfare may emerge as an increasingly important element of the U.S. response.
So, with those five factors shaping the current environment for dis- cussing submarines, I want to shift to the second part of my talk, which provides some comments on some specific programs, within the time available.
Columbia class
Let’s start with the Columbia class, and here I want to observe two things. First, the Navy as of last year assigned a confidence level of less than 50% to its cost estimates for the program, suggesting that the cost of this submarine is more likely than not to exceed its current cost estimate. And second, the new Nuclear Posture Review refers to the planned total of 12 Columbia-class boats as a minimum, suggesting a possibility that a future NPR might increase that figure. These two considerations under- score the importance of minimizing the cost of the Columbia-class boats by taking advantage of acquisition authorities that that Navy has at its disposal through the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund or elsewhere in the U.S. Code.
Also, I’ve talked in the past about the need for the submarine com- munity to generate some space within the schedule for designing and building the lead boat to absorb the potential schedule shocks of tech- nical problems. The submarine community is now working to achieve that kind of resiliency in the program schedule. Any progress that can be made on that front would be welcome, particularly given the technical challenges involved in the boat’s new electric-drive propulsion system.
Virginia class
I want to shift now to the Virginia-class program. The factors I men- tioned earlier that form the context for discussing submarines have pro- duced nothing less than a pedal-to-the-metal atmosphere regarding at- tack submarine procurement. The new 30-year shipbuilding plan turned the 1+1 Virginia-Columbia years into 2+1s, and policymakers are now looking at whether and how to turn the 2+0 years in the shipbuilding plan to 3+0s, beginning in FY22 and 23.
As an initial step in that direction, the House Armed Services Com- mittee’s mark on the FY19 NDAA recommends a bit more than $1 bil- lion in Economic Order Quantity advance procurement funding for two additional Virginia-class boats in FY22 and FY23. That’s a notable step. For policymakers who might be interested in doing something in FY19 even more robust than that, one option would be to authorize and fully fund both of those additional boats in FY19, on top of the two already requested this year, for a resulting an FY19 buy of four boats. Under this option, even though the two additional boats would be authorized and funded in FY19, they would execute on schedules consistent with boats authorized and funded in FY22 and FY23.
There might be three reasons for considering this option. The first is that it’s entirely possible to authorize and fund the procurement of ships with the understanding that the ships in question won’t begin construc- tion until a few years from now. When Congress funded a 2-carrier buy in FY83 and another 2-carrier buy on FY88, it did so in each case with the understanding that the second carrier would not start construction until a few years after the first.
Second, authorizing and funding the procurement of four Virgin- ia-class boats in a single year would send a strong signal of resolve and determination to China and Russia, which might be consistent with what I said earlier about the competition with China.
And third, if FY19 turns out to be a high point for defense fund- ing, fully funding the additional two Virginia-class boats now might help preserve funding for other initiatives in a future year when funding is
tighter.
A variant of this option would be to authorize the two additional boats in FY19, but partially rather than fully fund them. The addition- al FY19 funding under this option could be something between the $1 billion in the HASC markup and the roughly $7 billion combined full cost of the two additional boats. The reasons for considering this option would be generally the same as for the option of fully funding both addi-tional boats in FY19.
1 There are also two additional reasons that could be cited: First, authorizing and funding the two ad- ditional boats in FY19 would permit the Navy to fully incorporate them into the FY19-FY23 Virginia-class mul- tiyear procurement (MYP) contract as “true” MYP boats, with all the savings that are possible from that. (Thanks to Rear Admiral Michael Jabaley for reminding me of that.) Second, it would send a signal of reassurance to the industrial base that these two boats will, in fact, be procured, which might help add stability to the industrial base, including supplier firms.
Los Angeles class refuelings
I want to turn now to a third item, which is the effort to refuel and extend the service life of at least one, and possibly as many as five, Los Angeles-class boats, so as to help fill in the projected valley in SSN force levels. For me, this is a case study in how a changed security environ- ment can lead to the consideration of options that in earlier years re- ceived less attention.
A number of years ago, when I brought up the projected valley and talked about how it could lead to a period of weakened conventional deterrence, I didn’t get a sense that my argument got much traction. A few years later, however, that changed. And when I then brought up the idea of refueling the 688s, I wasn’t sure whether it would be feasible or cost effective, and again I didn’t sense that the idea was getting much traction. And then, a few years later, that also changed, and the first of those refuelings is now in the budget, with the possibility for another four a few years from now. The Navy’s report to Congress on this effort, moreover, says that it might be possible to expand the effort to include 2 more boats, which would make for a total of 7 rather than 5. All this is possible because the Navy has 5 orphaned Los Angeles class fuel cores in storage, plus another 2 that the Navy might be able to reconfigure into suitable cores with more extensive modification or analysis.
Another step would be to examine the potential costs of expanding the refueling effort further, to encompass a total of more than 7 Los An- geles-class boats. That would be much more expensive, because it would require building new Los Angeles-class cores, which would incur exten- sive production line restart costs. But given the history of this issue, I think it would be helpful if the Navy would run these numbers and show them. Those numbers might not look cost effective today, but given what I said earlier about the recognition lag regarding China’s whole-of-so- ciety strategy, something that might not look cost effective today might look more cost effective in the future.
Japanese submarines
I’d like to turn now to a fourth item, which is non-nuclear-powered submarines. The question of whether the United States should turn to non-nuclear-powered submarines as an additional means of mitigating the SSN valley has come up.
There is, in fact, a readily available option for this—an option that wouldn’t cost anything for the Navy to implement, because the addition- al submarines in question are already being built by Japan for use by the JMSDF.
For industrial-base reasons, Japan builds one non-nuclear-powered attack boat per year. Japan had previously planned on maintaining a force of 16 attack boats, so each boat was to be retired at age 16. Under Japan’s new defense plan, the goal is to build up to a force of 22 boats, so each boat will now be kept to age 22, and the force is to reach 22 boats by 2021.
Once again, I think you can see where this is going—if Japan were to instead keep its boats to age 30, it could expand its force to 30 boats— without building any more new boats they already plan to build. The additional costs of this option for Japan would be to operate and support the 8 additional boats, which have crews of about 70 sailors each.
These 8 additional Japanese-operated boats could not do what SSNs could do, but they would be capable of performing certain types of mis- sions. In addition, they would be located in the right part of the world for countering China. And perhaps most important of all, the size of Japan’s attack boat force under this option would reach 30 in 2029, which is al- most precisely when the U.S. Navy’s attack boat valley is projected to hit bottom. Years later, as the U.S. SSN force moves beyond the valley and grows toward its 66-boat goal, it would be easy, if desired, to contract the size of the Japanese force by once again retiring its boats at younger ages.
I have scoured the world for Western naval force structure options, and this opportunity to expand the size of the Japanese attack boat force at low additional cost for Japan is the biggest unrealized piece of low-hang- ing fruit that I have been able to find.
When I was in Tokyo in January for discussions with their Ministry of Defense, their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and their Cabinet Secretar- iat, I brought this issue up repeatedly, and I learned two things: First, the option is feasible, and could be incorporated as a change to their defense plan. And second, there was little if any awareness among the Japanese officials I spoke with about the projected valley in the U.S. SSN force, and consequently of how expanding Japan’s attack boat force could help compensate for a temporary decline in the size of the U.S. SSN fleet. Consequently, in my discussions with the Japanese,
I encouraged them to think about their attack boat force-level plan-ning not just in a Japan-only context, but in a joint Japan-U.S. context.
I keep hearing about the need to get serious about countering China. Well, if the United States and its allies and partners are going to get seri- ous about countering China, this is an option to talk about. Why should those eight boats be thrown away with usable life left in them when they could serve at a time when their continued presence in the force would be particularly helpful in terms of Western naval undersea capacity?
I bring all this up here because this option is something that members of the U.S. submarine community can raise in conversations they have with their Japanese counterparts. Japan may not pursue this option unless it hears about it consistently from the United States.
XLUUV
I want to turn now to my next item, which is the XLUUV program.
On this program, I have five points to make.
First, when the question arises as to whether the United States should turn to non-nuclear-powered submarines as an additional means of mit- igating the SSN valley, this could be another part of the answer, along with the option of expanding the size of the Japanese attack boat force.
Second, this looks like a potentially game-changing platform that the
Navy might consider highlighting more.
Third, there is interest in Congress, as shown in the hearings this spring, to learn about how UVs like this one might impact future Navy force-structure planning, so anything the Navy could do to illuminate that issue might be appreciated.
Fourth, this program is not just a technology and force-planning is- sue—it’s also an opportunity for sending signals of resolve and unpre- dictability to China and Russia. As I’ve said before in other settings, Chi- na and other countries often present the United States with surprises. But that’s a game that can be played both ways. As the Navy moves ahead with this effort, it might consider doing so with an eye on how might be structured so as to present China or Russia with some surprises, so as to
throw them back on their heels.
And fifth, if this turns out to be a platform that could be sold to U.S. allies, then its value as a force additive or multiplier could be that much greater—and it might also open up some opportunities for allies to help fund the development of selected technologies for future versions of the platform, in a manner analogous to how the Japanese funded the devel- opment of five technologies for the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor.
Submarine weapons
Everything I’ve talked about so far relates to platforms. I want to turn now to submarine weapons. My concern here is that the current focus on finding ways to build SSNs more quickly is pushing the topic of efforts to develop new submarine weapons into the background, which could create a risk of a loss of momentum for those efforts.
Like the XLUUV, the development of new submarine weapons could not only add capability to the undersea force—it could also create opportunities for surprising and sending signals of resolve to China and Russia. In that regard, Vice Admiral Connor’s testimony three years ago to the House Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee on undersea warfare game changers remains instructive.2
In the new security environment, it is now well recognized that in de- veloping new systems, speed of development and fielding has regained importance as a measure of acquisition success, because the United States no longer has the luxury of time and substantial capability overmatch that it did during the post-Cold War era. But speed isn’t the only metric that has regained importance—the value of surprise and of sending signals of resolve have as well, and it’s not clear to me that this has been ful- ly incorporated into the new acquisition paradigm. The development of submarine weapons is an area where that could happen.
Next-generation SSN
I want to finish this second part of my talk with one more item,
and that’s the next-generation SSN. The new 30-year shipbuilding plan
- Testimony of Vice Admiral (retired) Michael Connor before the United States House of Represen- tatives Armed Services Committee Sea Power and Projection Forces Committee Hearing [on] Game Changers— Undersea Warfare, October 27, 2015, 5 pp.
shows the lead boat of that next class being procured in FY34, and the
plan indicates that the design will focus on speed and stealth.
In my work on the Navy’s new frigate program, I raise a potential is- sue as to whether the Navy’s planned growth margin for that ship will be adequate. This is in part because the Perry-class frigates became weight critical, which made it more difficult to keep them mission-effective in their later years. But it’s also because I’m concerned that in light of what I’ve said about the recognition lag regarding China’s challenge, there’s a risk of shooting behind the rabbit regarding that frigate’s required ca- pabilities, in which case incorporating some additional growth margin, above what would be typical for such a ship, might be an option worth considering.
In a similar vein, given what I’ve said about the totality of China’s actions, there is a risk of shooting behind the rabbit in terms of what might be needed in terms of that new SSN’s capabilities. Thus, in addi- tion to speed and stealth, the Navy might consider emphasizing payload capacity and growth margin as well.
Many years ago, the best single-sentence description that I heard of the Seawolf submarine, with its big weapon magazine, was that it was designed to go into the Soviets’ back yard and do a lot of damage before having to return home for reloading. I’m wondering now whether some- thing like that will be needed in the next-generation SSN.
Three developments
That completes the second part of my talk. In the third and final part, which will be very brief, I want to take a step back and mention three unsettling trends in the greater world surrounding the submarine commu- nity, and what they might mean for all of us.
The first concerns the international environment, which features not just a return to great power competition, but a retreat from freedom and liberal democracy, and a resurgence of authoritarianism, autocracy, and illiberal democracy. Freedom House reports that the number of nations experiencing a decline in freedom has outnumbered those experiencing an increase in freedom for the last 12 years in a row. China is now openly arguing that its political system has advantages over the western liberal democratic model. And authoritarianism and illiberal democracy have now taken root inside the NATO alliance in countries like Turkey, Po- land, and Hungary.
The second unsettling development concerns the information and media environment in which the world now operates, and the effect that observers see it having, both here and abroad, in terms of encouraging a retreat from respect for facts, truth, experts and expertise, in favor of opinion, false information, lies, conspiracy theories, raw emotions, and tribal approaches to information and knowledge.
And the third unsettling development concerns what a number of observers view as an erosion of some of the democratic norms that help underpin the operations of our own democratic system.
You are no doubt aware of all three of these unsettling develop- ments—you can hardly expose yourself to the news without becoming aware of them.
The submarine community, as it goes about its work, is largely insu- lated from these unsettling developments, like a submarine at depth that is insulated from the rough weather and choppy seas above it.
Even so, I believe it would be remiss to stand before you today and not mention these things. As a consequence of these three unsettling de- velopments, these are not comfortable or normal times, and it would be foolish to pretend otherwise. And while it may be true that these trends are unlikely to affect the submarine community directly as a whole, they do have a connection to all of us as individuals.
The submarine community is known for technical excellence and disciplined engineering. But another way of stating that would be to say that the submarine community is rooted in the idea of facts, truth, ex- perts, and expertise.
And when policymakers decide to fund the development of new sub- marine technologies, or the procurement of new submarines and their payloads, they do so through a process that is not just outlined in the Constitution, but further informed by our democratic norms.
And when Navy submarines and their crews venture abroad to per- form their missions, they are doing so as representatives not only of American strength, but of our concepts of freedom and democracy.
Those are all things that you can be proud of—all the time, every day. But they are also things that need protecting, and as individuals, we each have some connection, however slight it might seem for each of us, to the task of protecting them.
It’s something to keep in mind as we go about our daily lives and work. And that’s the thought I will leave you with.
Thank you again for the chance to speak to you today, and I’ll behappy to respond to your questions.
