During the 45 years of the Cold War the Soviet Union operated the world’s largest submarine force, reaching a peak of390 “boats” in 1962. Based on this undersea force, the U.S. Navy had two principal missions:
(1) nuclear strike against the Soviet Union and other communist states, and (2) protecting ocean convoys sent to reinforce European allies in time of conflict against the massive Soviet submarine threat.
The U.S. nuclear strike mission initially was performed by the Reg ulus nuclear-armed missile on submarines and surface ships, and then by carrier-based strike aircraft and ballistic missile submarines. The convoy protection mission led to the construction of more than 130 es cort ships (after 1975 called frigates), the anti-submarine modernization of scores of older destroyers, the modification of aircraft carriers for the anti-submarine role, the construction and conversion of submarines for the hunter-killer role, and the procurement of hundreds of specialized land-based and carrier-based aircraft. And, U.S. assistance was provided to several allied navies in building up their anti-submarine forces.
Thus, as Western intelligence detected the Soviet Union producing hundreds of submarines-obviously to fight the “third battle of the At lantic”-the U.S. Navy and other NATO navies responded with massive investments to protect the ocean convoys that would carry troops, weap ons, bombs, bullets, fuel, and other critical material from North America to Europe. Whereas Nazi Germany in 1939 had begun World War II with only 57 U-boats and had threatened to sever the oceanic ties to Brit ain, the Soviet order of battle-according to U.S. intelligence-could begin a war with hundreds of undersea craft. (When World War II began in 1939 the Soviet Navy had 180 submarines in service.)
Immediately after World War II, U.S. Navy intelligence predicted that by the 1960s it was possible for the Soviets to have 1,200 or even 2,000 submarines of all types at sea. One U.S. admiral made two as sumptions in discussing these numbers:
first, an assumption that the Russians will maintain their numbers of submarines in approximately the same amount that they have now but improve their types and replace older types with new ones, and the second assumption, that by 1960 or within ten years, 1958, that the Rus sians could have two thousand up-to-date submarines. I have chosen that [latter] figure because I believe it is within their industrial capability of producing that number and I believe if they really intend to employ the submarines as a means of preventing the United States or her Allies from operating overseas that two thousand would be the number they would require for their forces. [emphasis added]
To reach 2,000 submarines it was estimated that Soviet shipyards would have to produce more than 16 submarines per month; U-boat pro duction in Germany during World War II had reached a maximum aver age of some 25 submarines per month. A Soviet admiral, also in 1948, reportedly alluded to the possibility of a Red undersea force of 1,200 submarines. ii
But the Soviets never planned to carry out a massive attack on mer chant shipping in a so-called Third Battle of the Atlantic. Discussions with Russian naval officers and submarine specialists have listed several reasons for that decision:
- The German Navy-experts in submarine warfare-was unable to “win” the Battle of the Atlantic in 1914-1918 or 1939-1945; why could the Soviet Navy expect to triumph in a similar campaign?
- At the start of both world wars the Allies were unprepared for a major anti-submarine campaign against Germany; but early in the Cold War the NATO navies began a buildup of anti-submarine forces.
- In World War II the German U-boats had essentially direct access to the North Atlantic from French ports. In a Third Battle the Soviet sub marines in the Baltic easily could be “bottled up” by NATO forces, while the Northern Fleet submarines would have to transit around Norway, a NATO ally, and then sail southward while within range of anti-subma rine forces based in Norway, Britain, and Iceland.
These “concerns” seemingly escaped Western intelligence. There were some indications of the Soviet reluctance to undertake a major ant ishipping effort; many of these appeared in articles in the professional magazine Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Digest), the Soviet/Russian Navy’s equivalent of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. But that publication was unclassified, hence material in that journal was “suspect”-often labeled “disinformation” by western intelligence.
Also, during World War II the U.S. intelligence community was to tally focused on Germany and Japan. Very few American officers gained any knowledge of the Soviet Navy and related activities.iii Accordingly, early in the Cold War the U.S. Navy turned to the surviving officers of the Kriegsmarine for assistance, employing these Germans to write about their experiences in fighting the Soviets at sea. One historian who studied the Soviet naval threat of the early Cold War period observed, “This early use of German views by American naval intelligence further entrenched the belief that the Soviet naval threat was a continuation of the German one and that another Battle of the Atlantic-this time re played with Soviet submarine crews-loomed on the horizon.” iv
On a practical basis, the question was asked: Why would the Soviets be building large numbers of submarines: The massive program initiated in the late 1940s produced 48 units in 1954 and 74 in 1955, with im provements in shipyards indicating that a steady rate of 80 or more sub marines per year easily could be achieved. Most of these were of a de sign labeled “Whiskey” by NATO intelligence. While they incorporated many features of the German Type XXI-the most advanced submarine of World War II-the Soviets considered these medium-range craft, for regional seas and defense of the homeland, not for long-range commerce raiding. Still, completing 215 of this class from 1952 to 1958-in addi tion to other submarines-was a peacetime record for any nation.
The building rate slowed as naval programs were cut back precip itously after the death of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin in March 1953. However, a short time later nuclear-propelled and missile-armed subma rines were observed on the building ways; Western intelligence analysts believed that the shift to more advanced undersea craft was the reason for the temporary slowdown in production. And, the analysts surmised, the nuclear units would join the diesel-electric (and air-independent pro pulsion) submarines still being built to threaten the North Atlantic ship ping lanes.
U.S. naval intelligence specialists began to “question”-not nec essarily change-their views in the late 1970s when the United States gained a special source of information on Soviet high-level military planning. One of the very first intelligence community documents to reflect this “new” source of information was a CIA top secret/code word report entitled “The Role oflnterdiction at Sea in Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations” (February 1978):
- The Soviet Navy has three principal missions-strategic strike, an tisubmarine warfare, and anti-carrier warfare-to which it would allo cate the majority of its forces in wartime.
- The Soviet Navy would, in addition, conduct selected attacks on merchant shipping over a wide area of ocean, partly as a means of dis rupting Western naval resources. The Soviets would probably allocate a small portion-perhaps 10 percent-of their attack submarine force toward this task.
The report also noted, “the number of merchant ships likely to be sunk over an extended period-four months-indicates that the Soviets have only a limited capability to impair the flow of shipping across the Atlantic, even if they were to reorder their priorities and allocate large forces to interdiction.”
Today Russia is undergoing a metamorphosis with the Navy receiv ing a major share of defense funding and considerable attention from the national leadership. Are U.S. and other Western intelligence analysts correctly assessing the potential future capabilities and roles of the Rus sian armed forces and, especially, the Navy? Based on publicly avail able information, discussions with Russian naval officers and industrial specialists, and other “sources,” it appears that three programs have the highest defense priorities (in alphabetical order):
- Missiles-strategic and tactical
- Submarines (attack, cruise missile, and ballistic missile)
- Tactical aviation
And, there is little indication that today’s Russian submarine force is intended to interrupt Western merchant shipping. Rather, the primary missions-of a comparatively small submarine force-is to (1) maintain and protect a viable SSBN force and (2) to counter Western SSBNs and U.S. aircraft carriers.
In the past Western intelligence was wrong about the primary roles of the Soviet undersea fleet. It also was wrong in assessing many of the characteristics of those submarines-their speed, operating depth, degree of automation, weapons, hull materials, etc. Even estimates of the Soviet rate of progress in submarine quieting-an area in which the
U.S. submarines unquestionably held the lead-generally were wrong.
Why these past failures? And, could such shortcomings in analysis be avoided in the future? First it is important to understand the “why” of these past intelligence failures. The following reasons are offered:
- We fail to consider all sources-classified/black and unclassified/
- We look for what we know and for what we want to
- We tend to mirror image… thus we do not accept new concepts if they do not fit our mindset and experience-that experience included two desperate Battles of the Atlantic.
- Excellent Soviet/Russian intelligence that gleaned secrets from Western classified and open sources as well as from classified sources… we are an open society.
- Poor U. counterintelligence that too often failed to identify agents within Western defense and intelligence communities.
The following are offered as possible solutions to this situation:
- Read history and contemporary writings-especially
- Look for “real’ threats-not just what’s easy to see… look at the forest while studying the trees.
- Look for the anomalies-even the small ones… avoid a “climate of “
- Share “ideas”-notjust intelligence-with friends and allies, in the “business” and in associated positions.
- Avoid looking for a panacea-most reorganizations and name changes in the intelligence field are political as are most slogans, e.g., “information “
-And, “think outside of the box.”
The last is very important. While many people often use that slogan, very few people do “think outside of the box.” Indeed, very few people can provide examples of that concept. Here are a few valid examples of this “technique.”
- One that directly relates to submarine warfare was Soviet subma rine designer Sergei Kovalev and the Typhoon ballistic missile subma rine (SSBN) that went to sea in late 1981 _v All previous SSBNs had their missile tubes in the after portion of an elongated sail or in the hull aft of the sail. Kovalev and his team considered numerous design varia tions including “conventional” designs, i.e., a single elongated pressure hull with the missile tubes placed in two rows aft of the sail; this last approach was discarded because it would have produced a submarine more than 770 feet long, far too great a length for available dry docks and other facilities. Instead, Kovalev and his team developed a unique and highly innovative design-the 441st variant that they considered. The ship has two, parallel main pressure hulls to house crew, equipment, and propulsion machinery; these are full-size hulls, each with eight com partments. The 20 large missile tubes are placed between these hulls, in two rows,jorward of the Thus, the Typhoon presented a unique configuration-and the largest undersea craft ever built.
- Admiral “Sandy” Woodward in the Arabian Sea exercise in l 982vi: In early 1982-shortly before the Falklands war erupted-then-Rear Admiral Woodward commanded a destroyer, three frigates, and three replenishment ships. His group was opposed by the U.S. aircraft carri er Coral Sea (CV-43), embarking some 80 aircraft, with accompanying cruisers and destroyers.
The British ships were some 200 miles from the U.S. carrier. As the exercise started a U.S. Navy fighter just happened to appear over Wood ward’s ships and identified them. Still, during the night-despite chal lenges from other U.S. aircraft and a surface warship–Woodward in the destroyer Glamorgan was able to close the 200-mile gap and, early the following morning simulated launching the ship’s four Exocet missiles at the Coral Sea (from a range of about 20 miles).
Woodward’s “bottom line”: “Therefore, reads the moral of this tale, take caution should you ever find yourself as a battle group commander in these circumstances, because it is fairly likely that in bad weather, you would lose the battle. This is especially true against a really determined attack in which the enemy is prepared to lose several ships in order to sink your carrier “vii
- Reducing the bounties on Al Qaeda leadersviii: During the Amer ican campaign against Al Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan, the U.S. government offered “hefty” bounties for Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other insurgent leaders. These bounties were highly publicized.-and rarely collected because of the deadly retribution against anyone who pointed out terrorist leaders to American forces.
Experts at the U.S. Central Command decided to “toy” with the ter rorist commanders: Military and intelligence analysts drew up a list of high-value targets. Then there was a public announcement that the boun ty on a particular terrorist leader had been slashed. Word was whispered in the local markets that the man wasn’t worth the higher reward because he had been injured or has been deemed incompetent.
According to Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker of The New York Times, the “less-valuable leader” now “wants to prove he is still im portant and worthy of the higher bounty. Even senior members of Al Qaeda’s global network have been suckered by the ruse and have been picked up after they made themselves visible not long after the bounty on their heads was reduced.”ix
The terrorist leaders had called attention to themselves by announc ing new plans to attack the enemy, often using their cell phones.
If U.S. military forces are to be effective in the future-against an exceedingly broad range of threats in both crises and conflict, they re quire first-rate intelligence. The men and women who collect, analyze, and provide that intelligence must be more efficient than those dedicated personnel who, in the Cold War, got it wrong with respect to the concept of the Soviet Navy fighting a Third Battle of the Atlantic.
The men and women of today’s intelligence community in many respects are better educated and have better tools than had their prede cessors. They must, however, learn the lessons from the Cold War and they must learn to “think outside of the box.” Some of our opponents certainly will.
