With bombers shifted to other duties and missiles aging out, the arsenal requires modernizing.
This OP-ED article was published in the Wall Street Journal and was updated on January 11, 2017. It is published here with the permission of the authors.
A B-52 bomber from North Dakota does a flyby in Marnes-la-Coquette, France. PHOTO: AFP/GETTY IMAGES
This open letter is signed by the following retired four-star
U.S. Air Force and Navy officers, all former commanders of the United States Strategic Command or its predecessor, the Strategic Air Command: Gen. C. Robert Kehler, Gen. Larry D. Welch, Adm. James O. Ellis Jr., Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, Adm. Cecil D. Haney, Adm. Henry G. Chiles, Gen. Eugene E. Habiger and Adm. Richard
W. Mies.
The United States has long relied primarily on a triad of nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) at sea, land- based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and long-range bombers to deter attacks on the U.S. and our allies. The combined capabilities of the triad provide the president with the mixture of systems and weapons necessary to hold an adversary’s most valuable targets at risk, with the credibility of an assured response if needed—the essence of deterrence. The triad’s flexibility and responsiveness among its elements allow political leaders to signal intent and enhance deterrence stability in crises or conflict.
Today’s triad is far smaller and postured much less aggres- sively than its Cold War ancestor. Shaped by presidential initiatives and sized by arms reduction agreements, by 2018 the number of weapons deployed on triad systems will be barely one- tenth of Cold War highs. Heavy bombers and supporting tankers are no longer loaded and poised to take off with nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles are aimed at open areas of the ocean. Theater nuclear forces have been reduced to a small number of dual- capable aircraft supporting the NATO alliance.
The common post-Cold War hope and expectation among Western leaders was for a benign “new world order.” The reality, however, is that the United States now faces far more diverse security problems and greater uncertainty than it did during the Cold War. Threats now range from small arms in the hands of extremists to nuclear weapons in the hands of hostile foreign leaders who frequently declare their willingness to engage in nuclear first use.
For example, Russia’s (and North Korea’s) explicit nuclear threats now remind us almost daily that nuclear weapons are not gone and it appears they will not be eliminated from world affairs anytime soon. Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear forces as the basis of strategies designed to expand their positions at our expense and that of our allies. In addition, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities now threaten our regional allies and eventually could threaten us directly.
Given these realities, the nation continues to need the strategic benefits we have come to rely on from a nuclear triad that works together with other elements of U.S. power to provide effective deterrence for the 21st century. We have participated in numerous studies and reviews that confirm that recapitalization of the nuclear triad is required and time is running out.
The last concentrated investment to modernize the triad came during the Reagan administration. We continue to rely on that era’s Ohio-class SSBNs, missiles, and B-2 bombers today as well as B-52s, Minuteman ICBMs, Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), and command-and-control systems that were designed and fielded far earlier. Even with periodic upgrades and life extensions, legacy systems that were conceived and deployed over three decades ago are reaching the inevitable end of their service lives.
Some former senior officials have recently recommended eliminating the ICBM leg of the triad. But we have already removed the bombers from the daily nuclear deterrence commit- ment, and we now essentially rely on a relatively small dyad of SSBNs and ICBMs to meet our daily deterrence requirements. The consistent readiness of our ICBMs has allowed us to adjust the number of SSBNs routinely at sea, and together the ICBMs and SSBNs have freed the bombers for use by commanders in a conventional role—with great effect across a range of national security needs to include against terrorist organizations.
Plans are in place (and are exercised) to return the bombers to nuclear alert if needed. Leveraging this dual-capable flexibility of the bomber force will be a significant strength of the future triad for deterring foes and assuring allies. In short, the combined strengths of the triad, including the ICBM force, continue to create great efficiencies and flexibility in support of our enduring national security objectives.
Eliminating the ICBM leg of the triad now would effectively leave the U.S. with a monad of SSBNs for daily deterrence, unless bombers are returned to nuclear alert status—which would mean that an unforeseen advance in antisubmarine warfare, or a technical failure in the SSBNs, their missiles, or warheads would force the president to choose between having no readily available nuclear deterrence capabilities or quickly returning bombers to nuclear alert—a step that carries its own cost and risk. Eliminating ICBMs would also greatly simplify an enemy’s attack problem, with implications for deterrence and stability.
National commitment and consensus are as important now as they were during the Cold War. We face an uncertain future and there is no higher national security priority than deterring the actual or coercive use of nuclear weapons against us and our allies. Our potential adversaries are not idly standing by, and we have run out of time to further delay the recapitalization of our nuclear deterrent. The United States will need a nuclear deterrent for as far into the future as we can see and a triad shaped to 21st century needs is still the most effective means to provide it.
A bipartisan consensus now exists in Congress in support of plans to modernize all three triad legs, the industrial complex that sustains our nuclear weapons, and the critical command and control system that links the president to the nuclear forces for positive control. Let’s get on with it.
