Since the end of the Second World War, there have been countless wars and conflicts of varying size and scope around the globe. Very few of them have involved significant naval action, and only two have re- sulted in submarine warfare to any degree deserving of the name. Those two conflicts provide important insights and lessons into the nature of submarine warfare in the modern world. The 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, although not primarily a naval war, saw the first use of submarines in combat since WWII. The presence of just one conventionally powered Pakistani submarine was enough to influence how the Indians employed their aircraft carrier. Additionally, in the only Pakistani naval success of the war, the submarine PNS Hangor attacked and sank an Indian frig- ate and then kept numerous surface combatants engaged for days in the search for her. The 1982 Falklands War saw the first use of modern nu- clear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), and they were decisive. Their speed and mobility allowed Britain to project power half a world away, and HMS Conqueror’s sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgra- no dealt a crippling blow to the Argentine Navy, whose surface forces afterward remained in their own territorial waters for the duration of the war. Conversely, the presence of one modern conventionally powered Argentine submarine forced the British to expend an excessive amount of time, energy, and ordnance in unsuccessful searching for her. Gath- ering these lessons and applying them to the submarine force today is an important exercise in preparing for any future conflict in which the
U.S. may be involved. These wars show us that submarines punch well above their weight in both kinetic power and deterrence and stress the difficulty and importance of effective coordinated anti-submarine war- fare (ASW). Applying these lessons correctly and effectively could be the deciding factor in the next war.
The 1971 Indo-Pakistani War
While submarines played many important roles in the post-WWII era, the first conflict to see kinetic action in the undersea domain was the short-lived 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. The war’s causes were many, in- cluding the historic enmity between India and Pakistan and widespread civil unrest in East Pakistan, or Bangladesh as it would shortly become known. When Pakistan’s ruling military junta violently suppressed the rebellion, the resulting flood of refugees into India further deteriorated relations between the two nations. From the breakout of war on Decem- ber 3rd to its conclusion less than two weeks later, several naval engage- ments would reveal the relevance and utility of conventionally powered submarines.
Prior to the opening of hostilities on December 3rd, PNS Ghazi (ex- USS Diablo, a Tench-class WWII submarine)1 was dispatched from Pa- kistan to the Bay of Bengal. The nature of her mission is disputed, but it seems likely she was sent to either mine the harbor at Visakhapatnam naval base on the eastern coast of India, search for the Indian Navy’s sole aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, or both.2 Despite her age, with a longer range than Pakistan’s three modern French-built Daphne-class subma- rines, the Ghazi was the only choice for the Pakistan Navy given the distance to the Bay of Bengal.3 On the night of December 3rd, several explosions were heard off the coast of Visakhapatnam, and subsequent investigation by Indian divers revealed the wrecked hull of the Ghazi. Interestingly, Ghazi had made no contact after November 26th, and noth- ing further was announced by either side until December 9th, when the Indians announced the sinking.4 The cause of the sinking is disputed, with Indian sources often claiming she was sunk after a depth charge attack by the INS Rajput.5,6 The Pakistanis refute this claim, and attri- bute the loss to an accidental mine detonation during laying operations, a cause supported by western observers.7
Whatever the reason for the loss, the result for the Indians was the removal of the chief threat to their one and only carrier.8 Fear of Pa- kistan’s submarines, the only asset able to project power at a distance against a superior Indian surface force, was one of the reasons the In-
1 (Harry 2001)
2(Hiranandani 2000, 140)
3(Cardozo 2006, Ch 2)
4(Hiranandani 2000, 141)
5(Hiranandani 2000, 143)
6 (Kaul May 1973, 190)
7 (Goldrick 1997, 83)
8 (Goldrick 1997, 83)
dians chose to keep the Vikrant in the Bay of Bengal where she would require fewer escorts. These fears were well founded. On December 4th, a submarine (likely the Daphne–class PNS Mangro out of Chittagong, East Pakistan) was sighted off the bow of Vikrant but was chased away by her escorts before firing a shot.9
The Arabian Sea, the other theater of naval engagement, saw signif- icant sparring between Pakistan’s two other Daphne-class submarines and Indian surface forces. Over several days, Indian surface combatants chased the PNS Hangor, carrying out several unsuccessful attacks. On the night of December 9th, Hangor located the frigate INS Khukri. Ac- cording to the Indians, three of nine homing torpedoes from Hangor struck Khukri in rapid succession, tearing her apart in three minutes.10
Alternatively, in a later interview, Hangor’s Commanding Officer at the time stated that one of only two torpedoes fired struck the magazine, sending Khukri to the bottom in minutes. Indian ASW assets spent sev- eral days extensively searching for the sub, but after enduring over 150 reported depth charge attacks, Hangor safely returned to port.11
The fighting ended on December 16th, when Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered. The naval conflict was not decisive, and neither side suffered major losses. However, the presence of Pakistan’s conven- tionally powered submarines was a serious obstacle for the more power- ful Indian Navy, and the only serviceable tool for the Pakistanis. While the majority of the Pakistani surface fleet stayed in Karachi for the du- ration of the conflict, its submarines were aggressively employed.12 De- spite her age, the range and independence of the Ghazi allowed her to operate far from Pakistan and close to Indian bases in the Bay of Bengal, where her presence was highly influential. The mere possibility of a tor- pedo attack on the Vikrant caused the Indians to employ her in a more conservative manner.13 Furthermore, the only Pakistani naval success of the war came from the Hangor’s sinking of the Khukri. The episode demonstrates not only the outsized power of any well-employed subma- rine, but also the difficulty of ASW prosecution and the large numbers of assets and ordnance that must be used to counter them.
9 (Kaul May 1973, 188-191)
10 (Kaul May 1973, 191)
11 (Tasneem 2001)
12 (Kaul May 1973, 193)
13 (Till 2009, 125)
The Falklands War
The second major conflict to see extensive submarine employment in the post-WWII era was the Falklands War. This two-month war pitted the armed forces of the ruling Argentine military junta against the naval, land, and air forces of the United Kingdom. Hostilities commenced ear- ly in the morning on April 2nd, 1982 when Argentine marines, some de- ploying from an Argentine submarine, landed on the small island of East Falkland. Thus began a major conflict between two nations over a few small islands inhabited by less than two thousand people and countless sheep, based on competing centuries-old claims of sovereignty.14 While this short, limited conflict did not alter the strategic picture in the South Atlantic, it offers the best example of modern submarine and anti-sub- marine warfare. It also provides important lessons about the challenges of employment and prosecution of modern diesel submarines and reaf- firms the vital role that modern SSNs play for nations that must protect interests and fight wars thousands of miles from the homeland.
The Falkland Islands, or “Malvinas” to the Argentines, are a small group of rugged and windswept islands in the South Atlantic, rough- ly 300 miles east of Patagonia. The date of their original discovery is disputed but starting from the late 17th century ships from various na- tions landed to plant the flag for king and country, take on water, hunt for seals, or establish short-lived colonies. The Argentine claim to the Malvinas is based on previous Spanish claims to the islands, which were overseen by a Spanish military governor beginning in 1767. When Span- ish rule in much of South America was later overthrown, a newly-inde- pendent Argentina claimed all former Spanish possessions in the region in 1816.15 British rule in the islands dates to the 1833 expulsion of the Argentine military governor of the Malvinas by Captain John Onslow of the H.M.S. Clio. The British, in addition to their claim based on an earlier settlement in the 176Es that lasted five years before being evicted by the Spanish, also cite their continuous settlement since 1833.16 After multiple failed efforts in the middle of the 20th century to press their case through the United Nations, in 1982 the Argentine ruling junta saw in the claim to the Malvinas an avenue to wrap themselves in the flag of
14 (Middlebrook 1985, 16)
15 (Middlebrook 1985, 23-24)
16 (Middlebrook 1985, 21-25)
nationalism. By attempting to assert their ownership of the islands, they sought to distract the country from numerous problems at home. The British, on the other hand, were defending their claims to both the Falk- lands and to other important islands in the South Atlantic, as well as the right of self-determination for the Falkland Islanders, who repeatedly had voiced their desire to remain under British rule.17
Submarines first entered the picture in late March of 1982, prior to the Argentine invasion. With tensions building, the Royal Navy dis- patched three of its modern nuclear-powered attack submarines towards the Falklands. The new Swiftsure-class boats Splendid and Spartan and the older Churchill-class Conqueror steamed at best speed towards the South Atlantic. With their speed and endurance, the SSNs were able to arrive in the conflict zone well before the rest of Britain’s conventionally powered forces.18 When the British declared a 200-mile naval exclusion zone around the islands on April 12th to prevent the Argentines from resupplying the invasion force by sea, the presence of these submarines was the only means the Royal Navy had to enforce it.19 The rest of the British task force would not reach the area for several weeks. Prior to declaring the blockade, the British had revealed the presence of their submarines in the area, effectively stopping Argentine reinforcement of the islands after April 12th.20
On May 2nd, the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, the sec- ond-largest ship in the Argentine Navy,21 was operating with two de- stroyer escorts to the southwest of the islands, just outside the exclusion zone. Determining that the Belgrano’s six-inch guns and armor and her escorts’ Exocet missiles were a threat to the British aircraft carriers oper- ating in the area, the Conqueror, having shadowed the Belgrano and her escorts for several days, requested and received permission to attack. At periscope depth and from a range of 1400 yards, Conqueror fired three pre-WWII Mark-8 straight-running torpedoes in a spread fashion to ac- count for solution inaccuracy. Two hit, and within 45 minutes the crew abandoned ship and the Belgrano sank with 368 hands lost, roughly a
17 (Middlebrook 1985, 29)
18 (Ruhe 1984, 8)
19(The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, Report to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence 1982, 17) 20 (Ruhe 1984, 8)
21 (Middlebrook 1985, 143)
third of the ship’s complement.22 After the torpedoes hit home, Con- queror cleared the area, evading depth charge attacks from the destroyer escorts.
There were voices in the international community that condemned the sinking of the Belgrano, but for the British the chance that the Argen- tine warship could escape over shallow water and attack their vulnerable aircraft carriers was too great. After the war, the British concluded that the sinking of the Belgrano effectively knocked the Argentine Navy out of the war.23 For the rest of the conflict, the Argentine surface forces stayed within their 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. As concluded in a summary of the war from the American perspective, Conqueror’s at- tack on Belgrano was “such a clear demonstration of nuclear submarine capability that no further attempt was made to risk any major Argentine warship outside of coastal waters.”24 British submarines continued to pa- trol the area and provide valuable intelligence but took no further kinetic action for the duration of the campaign.
British submarines were not the only ones to play a role in the South Atlantic in 1982. The Argentine Navy had four conventionally powered diesel-electric submarines: two WWII-era Balao-class boats, and two modern Type-209s built by Germany.25 The first Balao-class boat, San- tiago del Estero (ex-USS Chivo), did not see action, but the Santa Fe (ex-USS Catfish) participated in the initial invasion of the Falklands on April 2nd. While Santa Fe was submerged, 10 Argentine commandos were dispatched from the submarine to a beach to check it clear before amphibious assault forces landed on the island.26,27 Three weeks later, on April 25th, Santa Fe was located on the surface by British helicop- ters operating with the task force off South Georgia Island, several hun- dred miles away. After multiple depth-charge and torpedo attacks, Santa Fe reversed course and proceeded back to Grytviken Harbor on South Georgia Island.28 Badly damaged, the submarine was unable to return to sea and was captured by the British when they retook the island. She was
22 (Middlebrook 1985, 148-150)
23 (The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, Report to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence 1982, 17)
24 (Ruhe 1984, 9)
25 (Ruhe 1984, 9-10)
26 (Middlebrook 1985, 48-49)
27 (Harper 1994, 10)
28 (Middlebrook 1985, 108-111)
eventually scuttled after the war.29
Less is known about the activities of the Type-209s. A key lesson, though, is that these submarines, along with the Santa Fe prior to her removal from action, succeeded in tying up a large portion of the Brit- ish air and surface assets in the search for them. The presence of these submarines also caused the British Task Force commander to forbid the British submarines from attacking submerged targets, in an effort to pre- vent blue-on-blue attacks. The unsuccessful prosecution of these sub- marines highlighted the difficulties of shallow-water ASW and reBuired sustained and extensive operations by both air and surface assets.30 Ad- ditionally, a large amount of ASW ordnance was expended, contribut- ing to the overall cost of prosecution. The British were forced into this disproportionate response because the stakes were so high. The threat of an Argentine submarine sinking an aircraft carrier was unacceptable to them, and in their mind would have resulted in Britain losing the war.31
Lessons for Today
Submarines have been and continue to be force multipliers. Since the majority of foreseeable opponents in any war scenario possess some submarine capability, the submarine presence is both a threat to miti- gate and an opportunity to exploit. The ability of the U.S. Navy to put submarines anywhere in the world in a short amount of time is a huge advantage over all other nations, and one that should be maintained at all costs. The mobility and endurance of nuclear power coupled with the stealth of a modern submarine allows for the prepositioning of as- sets before hostilities begin, and their real or suspected presence can act as a deterrent to such hostilities. And if hostilities do break out, the disproportionate power and stealth of a modern SSN can quickly deliv- er a knockout punch to an enemy’s navy, raising the cost of deploying their naval forces to an unacceptably high level. Additionally, effective counters to enemy submarines must be readily available. Despite all ef- forts by the British, at least one Argentine Type 209 submarine was able to operate freely in the area, although the Argentine submarines nev-
29 (Brown 1987, 343)
30 (The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, Report to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence 1982, 23)
31 (Harper 1994, 23)
er engaged the British task force. Given a more capable opponent and modern cueing data, the results could have been drastically different. Using modern nuclear-powered attack submarines to sanitize the area and screen for high-value units like aircraft carriers is the best way to prevent a crippling loss that the British so feared. Short of this, costly and time-consuming ASW prosecution must be carried out by surface and air assets, with the possibility of limited success.
Studying the past is not the only way to prepare for the future, but it is one way. The lessons learned and relearned in 1971 and 1982 are applicable today and have important implications for the United States in any future conflict. There are four main takeaways that should be gleaned from these wars. First, heavyweight torpedoes are a potent weapon, and submarines are the only U.S. platform capable of deliv- ering them. As demonstrated by the Hangor and the Conqueror, sur- face ships remain vulnerable to torpedo attack. Submarines provide the means to deliver decisive blows that can knock out important enemy combatants, deter the deployment of naval forces, or bring adversaries to the negotiating table. Second, submarines do not have to go kinetic to have an outsized impact on the strategic or operational picture. The mere presence, suspected or otherwise, of U.S. submarines in a theater of conflict will cause an adversary to behave differently. The current advantages in stealth that the U.S. submarine force enjoys means the adversary will have to employ large numbers of ASW assets to counter a potentially small, unknown number of submarines, all the while pro- tecting their high-value units from attack. Every ship that is engaged in ASW is one less ship with their full attention on any blue-force surface or air assets in the area. Third, speed and mobility matter. The ability to rapidly position a large number of submarines in an area is a key ability the U.S. possesses. In an era of constrained budgets and the cur- rent downtrend in submarine numbers, we must remember that the key aspect of that ability is “a large number.” Carrier strike groups are im- portant tools of diplomacy and power projection, but submarines will enable the U.S. to control the seas on the other side of the globe. Last, what goes around comes around. It is all too easy to imagine ourselves as the Conqueror and the enemy as the Belgrano, but every conceivable adversary nation possesses some submarine warfare capability. We must maintain an edge in ASW so that adversaries cannot exploit the same weaknesses in us that we seek to exploit in them. There are no instanc- es of submarine-on-submarine warfare in the two conflicts considered above, but they do provide shining examples of the difficulties of con- ducting ASW with only surface and air assets. Effective, coordinated ASW between surface, air, and most importantly, subsurface assets will be vital to locating and neutralizing enemy submarines in the beginning stages of any conflict.
There are precious few examples of what modern undersea warfare looks like in practice. Studying those we do have, learning and apply- ing their lessons, and proactively preparing for the next conflict will go a long way towards ensuring our edge when war comes. We should not go searching for conflict, but when it comes the U.S. Navy and the submarine force need to be ready to provide overwhelming and decisive action. Success on that front could mean the difference between a quick, limited war or a long, bruising one. It could also mean the difference between victory and defeat.
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