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UNITED STATES SUBMARINE FORCE: GETTING FASTER

VICE ADMIRAL JOSEPH TOFALO, USN COMMANDER, SUBMARINE FORCES

Admiral, thank you for that kind introduction, and thanks to the NSL for hosting this fantastic event. It’s a pleasure to be here today to speak to the symposium’s theme, “Getting Faster,” so crucial given the extremely competitive world we now live in, and also provide an update on what the Submarine Force has been up to.

Let’s start with the theme—“Getting Faster,” For me this means, end-to-end as an organization, getting faster in our learning, processes, operations, innovation, and acquisitions. I’m not talking about rushing things, we’re bold not reckless, but I am talking about ensuring we as a Submarine Force can quickly learn and adapt at every level; from the Engineroom Lower Level deckplate to the 5th floor of the Pentagon, in government and industry, from the tactical to the strategic. It means acknowledging our long tradition of excellence, but also recognizing that if you’re not getting better, you’re probably getting worse, because someone is trying to pass you. It means realizing that we are engaged in a competition requiring innovation to win, but that innovation may in- volve some failure. It means challenging institutional inertia by remov- ing administrative distractions and cumbersome procedures that don’t add value and slow us down.

So if that’s what “Getting Faster” encompasses, why now? The bot- tom line is that we find ourselves in a great power competition at sea for which a sense of urgency is absolutely required, and for which second place is not acceptable. Russia and China are working hard and fast to strengthen their position, influence their neighbors, and shift the world order in their favor. Iran challenges security and commerce in their re- gion, including providing lethal assistance to those who would do us harm. North Korea’s reckless and provocative missile tests inform its advance toward the goal of a nuclear weapon that can threaten the Unit-ed States. In competition, time matters—the best Navy in the world can still lose if it shows up late. And by “late” I don’t only mean physically, but also in acquisitions, readiness, and tactics. “Lateness” can be man- ifest in: maintenance delays on existing ships that limit current opera- tional availability; being late-to-need in our ability to counter threats to enablers like satellite communications; or force structure shortfalls that don’t get solved until a decade from now. Given all this, I think the case for “Getting Faster,” and its associated sense of urgency is clear.

To more completely understand this sense of urgency, we need to look at our mission and the situation we face. Per U.S. Code, the mission of the Navy is to be prepared to conduct “prompt and sustained combat operations at sea,” and the Submarine Force does its part of that mission in and from the undersea domain. Given that approximately 70% of the world is covered in water and 80% of the population lives within a few hundred miles of an ocean coast, we have quite a lot to cover. It gets even more interesting when you realize that 90% of global commerce travels on the water and that near 98% of intercontinental communications, in- cluding financial transactions, travel not by satellite, but via underwater cable. You hear a lot of talk about “the cloud” in our information age, but the CNO has pointed out that it might be better to call it “the sea” because that’s where most of the data actually travels. Our prosperity and security as a maritime nation depend on this domain and the asso- ciated flows of goods and information. As a Force, we are charged with exploiting the unique advantages afforded by undersea concealment to secure these accesses for ourselves and our allies, and threaten those of potential adversaries, putting them on the defensive in their own back yards if necessary.

The character of this environment has always been in constant flux but the current rate of change is increasing exponentially as global mar- itime and information systems expand and technological advancement accelerates. Now add in the fact that it’s a competition. Thinking adver- saries are out there studying us and innovating. For the last 15 years, our Navy primarily supported a land war in the Middle East, with emphasis on power projection ashore and fighting from uncontested sanctuary in the littorals. In contrast, over the next 15 years our emphasis must in- stead be on high-end combat in deep blue water. We’re seeing a return to great power competition at sea; an environment where we’ve enjoyed uncontested superiority for decades. I cannot say it more succinctly than the CNO did earlier this year: “Our adversaries are improving more quickly than we are. We must increase our naval power today, pick up the pace, and maintain our winning advantage.” That means revitalizing our sea power to increase our ability to decisively win high- end conflict at sea and deter conventional war while simultaneously maintaining our strategic influence. As adversary systems proliferate that are designed to deny our Navy vast ocean areas, the share of the Navy’s responsibility that falls on U.S. submarines with their unique access, will only grow. The winners in the competition we face will be those who can keep up with the changes; the winners will be the ones that, as the symposium theme states, are “Getting Faster.”

All of this makes for a challenging, dynamic, and busy time for the Submarine Force. It’s also why this is a great time to be a submariner! As I speak to you today, your Submarine Force is “on scene, unseen”—pro- viding strategic deterrence and forward presence all around the world. Let me tell you a little bit about what we’ve been up to and how we’re meeting the challenges we face.

I’ll start with the mission-set that the Navy Design calls “founda- tional to our survival as a nation.” I am of course talking about strategic deterrence. Secretary Mattis has also said: “maintaining the nuclear de- terrent is the number one priority of the Department of Defense.” Living as we do in the aftermath of almost two decades of combatting violent extremist organizations, it is easy to forget that in the 300 years prior to WWII and the 1945-advent of nuclear weapons, the major powers of the day were involved in five to seven great wars per century. An estimated minimum average of 1% of the world’s population died each year due to armed conflict, with huge spikes during WWI and WWII. In the 70 years since the 1945-introduction of nuclear weapons, that average percentage drops by about a factor of 10. We’ve certainly had terrible regional con- flicts and terrorist acts, but major power war has been prevented. We lost approximately 3000 people on 9/11, an absolute tragedy. But consider that by many estimates, over 70 million people died in World War II. That’s major-power war, and I submit that strategic deterrence has pre- vented that from happening for the last 70 years.

The Submarine Force continues to play its important part in strate- gic deterrence today; with 14 SSBNs consistently meeting STRATCOM requirements and providing a safe, secure, and effective strategic deter- rent, including approximately 70% of the nation’s accountable warheads under the New START treaty. Over the past two years that force has conducted 52 strategic deterrence patrols and demonstrated the reliabil- ity of our weapons with 10 successful D-5 missile launches. Every day, U.S. submariners demonstrate a broad world-wide two-ocean deterrent, made manifest in the past year by SSBNs surfacing in places as far west as Guam, as far north as Dutch Harbor, Alaska, and as far east as Faslane, Scotland.

Of course, the mission of the United States Submarine Force extends beyond strategic deterrence. Nuclear-powered submarines have a unique ability to project power far forward, opening doors that might otherwise be closed to the greater Joint Force, and holding critical adversary assets at risk. Our 50 SSNs and 4 SSGNs are on the job, consistently providing access with influence, vital intelligence, conventional deterrence, and when necessary, unparalleled warfighting capability all over the globe. At any given time, our SSNs and SSGNs are deployed far forward sup- porting Combatant Commander missions in ways that only a nuclear- powered submarine can. To maintain that tempo we’ve conducted 44 SSN deployments and 15 SSGN crew cycles over the last two years. That’s absolutely amazing, and a testament to our outstanding readiness.

I mentioned earlier that our SSNs and SSGNs have spent much of the last 15 years supporting land warfare. A return to great power com- petition at sea means looking at mission sets we’ve not had to focus on as much, such as sea control. To support this, we’ve re-invigorated sub- marine tactical development by: establishing the Undersea Warfighting Development Center with new lines of effort; re-organizing and re-kin- dling our Tactical Analysis Group; and increasing the number of tactical development exercises. Submarine tactical development is on an aggres- sive glideslope towards refining our tactics and skills for the high-end fight. Beyond tactical development, we’ve increased the amount of high- end sub-on-sub tactical experience that our crews get exposed to. This experience is extremely useful in preparing for high- end warfighting as well as challenging peacetime missions.

All of that said, Secretary Spencer made a comment recently about the Navy’s rucksack being pretty heavy, so I’m mindful that if we put something in, something else needs to come out. So we’ve fine-tuned our Fleet Readiness Training Plan to support our emphasis on the high- end fight in a number of ways. We’ve started by restructuring the way we do Tactical Readiness Evaluations. Previously, these evaluations as- sessed some competencies which were duplicative of areas owned by the Squadron Commodore or assessed elsewhere, such as during the Pre-Overseas Movement Evaluation. Now TREs focus almost exclusive- ly on warfighting readiness, which ensures the TRE is focusing on the high-end fight. Furthermore we eliminated a low- payoff basic training period for crews that are coming off a deployment vice coming out of a shipyard. We also tweaked the spacing of focused training periods led by our Submarine Learning Centers to enhance their effectiveness, and restructured the POMEVAL, or deployment certification, with a focus more on the challenging peacetime missions a deploying submarine is about to go do.

In our operations and tactical development we are conscious of both historical commitments to allies as well as keeping abreast of changes to the future warfighting environment. I’ve already mentioned visits by our SSBNs to foreign ports, and our SSGNs and SSNs have recently been in the news making port calls to South Korea. We’ve already started working with our allies on our plans for ICEX-2018, and have conduct- ed extensive Theater ASW operations with the U.K, France, Norway, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and other European and western Pacific nations. We continue to coordinate with South American navies, including Chile, Peru, Columbia, and Brazil, to foster regional naval cooperation, promote regional maritime strategy, and provide mutually beneficial advanced ASW training to each partner-nation.

So I’ve described how Forces Afloat are “Getting Faster” by adjust- ing our training and operations to match changes in our environment. But to stay the best submarine force in the world we also need to own the best undersea systems and platforms. This means buying the best submarines, and then maintaining and modernizing them when needed.

Of course the biggest news here is the COLUMBIA- class replace- ment for the OHIO-class SSBN. The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition signed the Milestone B decision memorandum earlier this year, and as I speak to you today we are literally bending metal for this vital modernization program.

The other big news is in the VIRGINIA-class program. When USS Washington, the second FY11 ship, was delivered last May, the Navy was now at full production of two VIRGINIA-class SSNs per year, both authorization and delivery, after two decades of zero to one. And we’ve maintained the pace with COLORADO’s delivery last month. The VIR- GINIA-class program is a posterchild for “Getting Faster” in our acqui- sitions by evolving in stride a proven design. Just this year, the first of our Block III VIRGINIA’s, the USS North Dakota, conducted the first launch of a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile from a VIRGINIA Payload Tube, demonstrating a system that will help us keep pace with the ever accelerating rate of technological change by offering more flexibility in the payloads our submarines carry.

Our quest to own the best is not just about submarines but it is also about owning the best supporting systems, including off-board and sur- veillance systems. The future force must grow longer arms to expand and maximize our effective reach from the undersea. This includes range and geographic area, the breadth of effects we deliver, the domains we impact (undersea, land, air, surface, cyberspace), and the influence achieved through a system of undersea forces. Covering additional area and mission capabilities by adding a family of unmanned vehicles to the Submarine Force tool kit is very important to us. That’s why we stood up Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Squadron ONE this past month. This historical event demonstrates the Submarine Force’s commitment to the future of unmanned undersea systems and acknowledges their place in undersea warfare.

However the very fact that we stood up a squadron full of ‘people’ to support ‘unmanned’ demonstrates the timeless truth that it’s the people who are our real national treasure and who bring any machine to life; from design and build, to maintain and operate. And I am here today to tell you that the quality, dedication, and drive of this generation of un- dersea warriors is eye-watering. There are a number of initiatives I’m excited about across the Force that I want to share with you today.

First off, the crews of our submarines are more male- female integrated than ever before. As I speak to you today, a fifth of our crews are already integrated, including 14 OHIO-class and 4 VIRGINIA-class. These crews are completing deployments in support of each and every mission our submarines can perform around the globe. Our first female submarine Line Officer recently completed Department Head training and returned for a second sea tour as an SSN Engineer. Out of our first year group (YG10) of female submarine Line Officers, we exceeded our goal for retention to Department Head by over 10%.

On the enlisted side, we have over 75 enlisted women serving aboard four integrated SSGN crews. The first enlisted female was awarded her dolphins last fall, and USS Michigan completed her first mission as an integrated crew in the Spring of this year. USS Florida’s first enlisted women are in the process of reporting aboard and will complete that process throughout the remainder of 2017. The selection of USS Ohio’s first cohort of enlisted women is complete and they will begin to report this Fall, with the Chiefs reporting first followed by E-6 and below—this will continue throughout 2018. Finally, we’ve updated our enlisted Women in Submarines plan to integrate two more VIRGINIA-class sub- marines, New Jersey and Iowa, following officer integration.

I mentioned earlier that we’re revising our approach to training and tactical development to focus on the high-end fight. We’re also learning to look at human factors and safety in new ways. The Force Improve- ment and Operational Safety, or FIOS, program is the lynchpin of this effort. We are using it to strengthen our culture of continuous assessment and improvement. You may be familiar with our 2015 policy that all sub- marines now operate on a 24 hour sleep cycle to reduce crew fatigue and mishap risk. That work was one of the first FIOS initiatives. Within the last year, we’ve also implemented an Operational Safety Officer aboard each submarine. This individual promotes the unit’s operational safety culture, provides an independent safety assessment directly to the unit’s CO, and manages incoming and outgoing lessons learned. We’ve also added a full chapter on human factors to the Submarine Contact Man- agement Manual. This is the first chapter in a submarine tactical manual dedicated to human factors in tactical performance. The new chapter so- lidifies the results of two years of analysis regarding human factor con- tributions to contact management deficiencies. Given that roughly 85% of the Navy’s mishaps and near misses are caused by human error, we predict that we can better prepare our watch team leaders and operators by giving them a better understanding of the human factors that lead to poor decision making and error. This ultimately should reduce risk and improve mission success. Another example is how we are using evalu- ations of technical, behavioral, and organizational factors to proactive- ly, vice reactively, identify leading indicators of team performance. This process can provide unit commanders an additional assessment tool to assist them in evaluating their crew and give them a sense of whether their team performance is trending negatively. Finally we are promulgat- ing new Operational Fundamentals evaluation guides in three areas: As- sessment & Improvement, Team Dynamics, and Operational Planning. These now give ships, and external inspection and certification teams, a formal and force-wide standard against which to evaluate these founda- tional competencies.

Another area I’m particularly proud of is the way that we are in- tegrating modern performance psychology into a cohesive program to build Sailor toughness and resiliency. Our Embedded Mental Health Program places trained mental health expertise on the waterfront in each submarine home port. Our approach is preventative vice corrective, and is evidence based. We’ve used a standard psychological instrument to assess improvements in toughness over time. We introduced the program in Norfolk and piloted it there for three years, and the impact has been pretty dramatic. From 2014 to 2016, in Norfolk where the Embedded Mental Health program was piloted, we saw an 87% drop in psycho- logical unplanned losses. Needless to say, we think there’s a “there, there.” Furthermore, our toughness and resiliency efforts are more than just making psychological resources more available on the waterfront. By embedding the providers at the waterfront we’ve also opened an ex- tremely healthy dialogue between the mental health professionals and the submarines’ leadership. This new feedback loop helps open the ap- erture of the Officers and Chiefs, allowing us to get to the left of issues in a more proactive vice reactive way. To further open that aperture, we also instituted an Executive Coaching program for COs and XOs, adding more tools to their leadership toolboxes, and it has been so well received that we’ll be expanding it to the Chiefs of the Boat next year.

I’m also proud to report, that the Submarine Force is doing well on retention. Our first and second term Enlisted retention is 65% and 80% respectively, both about 25 points above the Navy average. We’re con- stantly working to take care of our people and give them job satisfaction, and there is certainly no question for them as to the importance of the Strategic Deterrence and Theater Undersea Warfare missions.

On the Officer side we recently conducted the first Junior Officer retention Survey in over 10 years and got triple the number of responders than the typical Navy survey. With Submarine Learning Center’s assis- tance we convened our first JO Symposium with officers from each sub- marine homeport represented to review the survey results and develop solutions. We have already taken action on the outstanding feedback, and I’m happy to report not a single “red detail” or forced assignment for a Junior Officer in over a year – that’s huge!

All of that said; we do have challenges that we need to address as well. The CNO frequently talks about the “triple whammy:” unrelenting operational requirements; an austere fiscal environment punctuated by the Budget Control Act caps and sequestration; and a lack of stable and predictable funding. Regarding the Budget Control Act, SECDEF has said in congressional testimony that “no enemy in the field has done more to harm the warfighting readiness of our military than sequestra- tion.” Regarding unpredictable funding, we’ve operated on a Continu- ing Resolution for over a third of the last nine years. These conditions complicate readiness generation in many ways, but it’s perhaps most poignant in our Public shipyards. There are numerous reasons for how we got to where we are, but the bottom line is that we have a work- load-workforce mismatch, lagging infrastructure investments, and an associated backlog that impacts our Force’s operational availability. In the past 8 years, 6 SSNs have taken or are projected to take 50%-100% longer to complete their overhauls than expected, with the shortest delay a non-trivial 11 months. I will point out that despite this, USS Rhode Is- land, an SSBN, is currently on track to complete her overhaul in a record 27 months despite these other delays—another example of the emphasis we put on Strategic Deterrence. The good news is that military and civil- ian leadership recognize the significance of the situation, and for 2017 Congress approved about $13B above the Budget Control Act for things like Navy readiness, and for 2018 the President’s Budget request like- wise has about $50B above the Budget Control Act, again for things like Navy readiness. We’ve also shifted about 1 million man-days of work in SSN availabilities over five years, from public to private shipyards. This will certainly help with that workload-workforce mismatch I men- tioned. Nevertheless, with 70% of our accountable nuclear warheads on 14 SSBNs and an unwavering Combatant Commander demand solidly on the shoulders of a diminishing number of SSNs and SSGNs, you can see why any shipyard delays have my full attention. The Constitution says that we must “provide and maintain” a Navy, so we’ve got to ensure we also get the “maintain” part right.

So for this audience, made up predominately of industry and govern- ment, as I conclude my remarks, I want to leave you with some thoughts for what you can do. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it’s certainly a great place to start.

  • The first won’t be a surprise: they didn’t pick today’s theme out of a hat. We need to be “Getting Faster,” in learning, processes, opera- tions, innovation, and As the CNO states in his Future Navy White Paper, “the competition is on and pace dominates…in an exponen- tial competition, the winner takes all…we must shake off any vestige of comfort or complacency that our previous advantage may have afforded us…”
  • Second, we need first-time There’s a tension here between speed and innovation, which may involve some risk, and the steady pro- duction of high quality capability. We need to learn to thrive in that ten- sion if we want to win. Don’t misread me, I’m not saying it’s okay to fail—it’s not. But we have to have some tolerance for failure. As John Paul Jones said, “those who will not risk, cannot win.”
  • Third, regrettably first-time quality alone is not enough, for we also need it to be at as low a price-point as possible. This in itself is a place ripe for innovation.
  • Fourth, we need upgradable designs that allow for rapid updates as technologies mature. Said another way, we need to “bake in” “Getting  Faster.”
  • Fifth, we need rapid, expansive and resilient networking to allow us to enable many more combinations of platforms, sensors, and payloads. This is at the heart of ADM Davidson’s Fleet Design and its core elements of Integration, Distribution and Maneuver.
  • Finally, we need to continue to do better in the vital area of cyber Every industry and government partner in this room has an ob- ligation to aggressively guard against the theft of our nation’s intellectual property.

Again, not an exhaustive list, but certainly some good food for thought.

Yes, the competition is fierce and second place is not an option. However, I have two profound reasons for hope. As I look out onto this audience I see a tremendous collection of extremely smart and energized industry and government partners. I also have the distinct privilege of leading the finest Submarine Force the world has ever known. With this one-two punch, we are unbeatable.

May God bless the Navy, our Submarine Force, and the United States of America. Thank you.

 

 

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