COMSUBDEVRON TWELVE held a Change of Command and Sundown Ceremony at the Submarine Force Library and Museum, Groton, Connecticut, 15 January 2016. OPNAV Notice 5400, 29 Feb ruary 2017, renamed Commander, Submarine Development Squadron TWELVE as Commander, Submarine Squadron TWELVE ending a re markable 67 year experiment in Submarine Force tactical development. CAPT Frank Andrews, USN (ret), COMSUBDEVGRU TWO, 1962-1964, in the lead article in the first issue of The Submarine Re view in 1983, wrote “One of the brightest ideas the Submarine Force has ever had was the formation of a permanent special-mission team which employed operating submarines and was called the Submarine Develop
ment Group.” (Reference [a]).
History. Submarine Development Group TWO was formed in 1949 to “solve the problem of using submarines to detect and destroy enemy submarines.”
The origin and early days of SUBDEVGRU TWO are described in RADM Roy Benson’s oral history (Reference [b]). CAPT Andrews, (Reference [a]) in discussing the history and contributions of the DEV GRU from 1949 to 1982, divides that history into three eras: I. Start up and Exploitation of Battery Boats; II. TAG, Full Arrival of Nuclear Boats, Towed Array and Mk 48; and III. NWP 70 series, Transition to SSN 688, Reemphasis of Naval Squadron Responsibilities.
RADM Robert R. Fountain, USN (ret), COMSUBDEVRON TWELVE, 1976-1978, at the 50th Anniversary Symposium; chaired by ADM Bruce DeMars, USN (ret), COMSUBDEVRON TWELVE, 1978-
1979; held at Subase New London in May 1999; described the fifty year history and accomplishments of the Command and identified challenges facing the Command going forward (Reference [c]).
The Squadron Commanders during the Command’s 67 year history are listed in Figure 1. The Submarine Force assigned their “best and brightest” to lead this unique command. The Commanders in the 1950s
were all distinguished World War II submarine captains including Roy Benson, USS Trigger; Barney Sieglaff, “Operation Barney”; and Earl Hydeman, “Hydeman’s Hell Cats”. All the 1950s Commodores were Navy Cross awardees, several with multiple Navy Crosses (Gallaher, 4 Navy Crosses; Sieglaff, 2 Navy Crosses; Walker, 2 Navy Crosses). As the Submarine Force transitioned to an all nuclear force, the World War II captains were followed by captains experienced in Cold War special operations. Almost all subsequently achieved flag rank; six with four stars (DeMars, Mies, Giambastiani, Donald, Caldwell, Richardson) and six with three stars (Jones, Metzger, Munns, Van Buskirk, Burke, Merz). Tactical Analysis Group (TAG). In 1963, CAPT Frank Andrews established a Tactical Analysis Group consisting ofNaval officers trained in operations analysis and civilian analysts. Embedding analysts in an operational squadron was unique in naval tactical development at the
time and would remain so for the next 50+ years.
This wasn’t a new idea in the Submarine Force.
VADM Charles A. Lockwood, USN, COMSUBPAC, 1943-1946, in Sink ‘Em All: Submarine Warfare in the Pacific (Reference [d]) describes the SORG at COMSUBPAC during World War II:
“Back in the fall of 1943 we had added a small section to our Head quarters Staff The new outfit, headed by Dr. K.F. Rinehart, was named SORG (Submarine Operational Research Group). This addition repre sented a distinct departure from traditional naval organizational set-ups. Its mission was to study and analyze patrol reports and other forms of intelligence, to determine whether or not our operational methods were the most effective which could be employed, what enemy antisubmarine measures were most dangerous to our boats, what evasive tactics on our part led to best results, and so on. In short, Dr. Rinehart and his assis tants were an unbiased, uninhibited, scientific group of kibitzers, who reduced everything we did to figures or graphs and showed us in black and white what was happening. They were in constant contact with AS WORG (Anti-Submarine Warfare Operational Research Group) in Ad miral King :S Tenth Fleet in Washington, from whom they got valuable tips based on the Battle of the Atlantic. The results they produced were startling at times and always highly valuable in shaping the trend of our efforts. Before the war ended they could tell us- and prove their state-ments-what firing ranges produced best results, what type of torpedo spread got the most hits, what agencies probably caused our heaviest losses-there seemed to be nothing which they could not reduce to a punch card on an IBM machine. The results of their studies were pub lished monthly or oftener, in our Submarine Bulletin. ”
The contributions of the DEVGRU/DEVRON TAG to submarine tactical development and evaluation over the years were extensive. Pri mary areas were
- Submarine tactical Planning, conduct, reconstruction and analysis. These exercises helped provide estimates of Weapon Sys tems Effectiveness. Exercises included the “Big Daddy” series of ASW exercises in the 1960s; the RANGEX series of passive ranging exercises; the SUBASWEX series of ASW exercises; the SECEX series of security exercises; the SSN 688 Tactical Development Program; and the TACDE VEX series;
- Analysis of real-world operations;
- Naval Warfare Publications Series 70 and NTTP/NTRP 3-21 se ries;
- Submarine Fleet Mission Program Library, ARCI and APB-tac tical decision aids.
Almost all the TAG civilian analysts were ex-submariners. Howev er, for 40 years, the TAG included a few young Ph.D. mathematicians without prior experience with the Navy. This small group made signifi cant contributions in a number of areas: Submarine Search Manual, Pas sive Ranging Manual, Acoustic Data Manual, TMA Reference Manual, US/UK Tactical Development project, SFMPL TACAIDs, towed array TMA, and time-corrected Ekelund ranging.
Data is oxygen for ops analysis. Ironically as data has become much easier to archive electronically on the boats (as opposed to manual logs in the 1960s-l 980s), analyst access to those electronic records has be come much harder (“Why do you want it? Tell me what you are going to do with it?”)
Being embedded in an operational squadron like COMSUBDEV RON TWELVE allowed the analysts easy informal access to the squad ron boats, their crew, and their data which helped immensely in identify ing and quickly resolving problems.
Montgomery C. Meigs (Ph.D. historian and U.S. Army General), in his study of scientists and subsurface warfare in World War II, Slide Rules and Submarines (Reference [e]) observes
“The intimate relationship between knowledgeable scientists and naval officers immersed in operations made for the closest possible link between the operational problem and the potential technological solu tion. This intimacy depended on the removal of service bureaucracies normally charged with development and procurement. ”
Meigs concludes that
“American scientists contributed to American victories in subsur face warfare in World War II in two ways. They forged better weapons of war. But most important, they measured and analyzed, in a way far more unbiased than their counterparts in uniform, what was happening in combat at sea and what had to be done to win. To the credit of the Navy, younger men like Captain Wilder D. Baker, Vice Admiral F.S. Low, and Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood saw the merit of ideas of scien tists. With the support of pragmatic senior leaders like Admiral Richard S Edwards, Admiral Chester Nimitz, and Admiral Royal Ingersoll, they were able to make these ideas an indispensable component of victory at sea.
Conclusion. Admiral John M. Richardson, USN, Chief of Naval Operations (COMSUBDEVRON TWELVE, 2005-2006) in A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority (Reference [fJ), challenges the Navy to “Optimize the Navy intellectual enterprise to maximize com bat effectiveness and efficiency. Reinvigorate an assessment culture and processes. ” and to “Understand the lessons of history so as not to re learn them. ”
In the years between wars, military organizations can lose focus and become so sclerotic that they must be disestablished.
But for many years, embedding scientists with Naval officers in an operational squadron provided the Submarine Force an “assessment culture” for developing tactics and assessing its weapon systems. This bright idea has served the Submarine Force well in the past, supports the lines of effort in A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, and would serve the Submarine Force well again in the future.
