Author and naval historian Norman Polmar and Engineer/Scientist (and former editor of Undersea Warfare magazine) Edward Whitman have collaborated in writing what is advertised as “… the first compre hensive history of all aspects of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) from its beginnings in the 18th Century… “. But the two volume set Hunters and Killers is more than that.
ASW can only be understood in the context of the submarine oper ations it is attempting to counter. Thus, the capability of the submarine and the way in which it is operated impacts ASW as much as – and often more than-the weapons, sensors, and tactics that anti-submarine forces employ. Recognizing this fact, Hunters and Killers dedicates as many pages to describing submarine campaigns as it does to analyzing ASW efforts against these campaigns. For example, some 45 pages are dedi cated to describing the World War I German U-boat campaign and over one hundred pages to describe in great detail the World War II Battle of the Atlantic. The coverage of these campaigns and the analysis of the success (or lack thereof) of the submarine forces and the ASW efforts against them yield valuable, and often fascinating insights into what worked and what didn’t, with many of these insights just as applicable today as they were 75 or 100 years ago.
Hunters and Killers is published in a large format (8 ½X 11 inches) with many excellent photographs, charts and illustrations. Volume I cov ers the period 1776 (attempted attack on HMS Eagle by the submersible Turtle) to May, 1943, when Admiral Doenitz ordered his wolfpacks to withdraw from the North Atlantic convoy routes because the massive Allied investment in ASW had finally turned the tide against the German U-boat. Volume 2 considers the remainder of World War II, covers the Cold War ASW buildup, and takes ASW up to the present day, with pro jections of submarine warfare/ ASW issues of the future.
The popular press often characterizes ASW as a game of cat-and mouse, with ASW forces being the cat and submarines being the mouse. Hunters and Killers demonstrates how, over time, the tactical advantage has swung back and forth between cat and mouse. Surely in the begin nings of the two world wars, the advantage was decidedly with the sub marine mouse but by the end of World War II, the ASW cat had forged ahead. After World War II, assets dedicated to ASW declined and sub marine technology forged ahead, culminating in the nuclear submarine and quiet, long-endurance conventional submarines, some with air-in dependent propulsion. Despite significant investments in ASW sensor systems and weapons, it was unclear whether the cat of the mouse was in the ascendancy. But with the continued quieting of Soviet/ Russian nuclear submarines and the huge reduction in ASW investment (sensors, platforms and, importantly, training) as the Cold War ended, it would appear that the mouse now has a significant advantage.
Those who believe this to be the case should read Chapters 8 through 13 of Volume 2 and ponder what happens to the cat-mouse equation if non-acoustic sensors are developed which allow for detection of the quietest of submarines-“ours” and “theirs.” The Soviets/Russians have been conducting significant research in this area and have fielded suites of detection systems which, while individually far inferior to U.S. acous tic detection systems of the past, when netted together appear to have much more detection capability than we ever credited them with.
Hunters and Killers is an obvious “must read” for those who are
interested in ASW-particularly the decay of ASW capability in the U.S. Navy. But of equal importance, those who design, equip, and operate submarines should, in particular, read Volume 2 and ponder the impact on the U.S. submarine force if the cat does, in fact, have some non-acous tic ASW tricks up its sleeve.
Rear Admiral Brooks served as the Director of Naval Intelligence 1988-1991.
